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The development of subjecting government procurement awards to judicial 
review is a relatively recent development in South African law. It accords with 
a similar development in the United States, as well as South Africa’s own 
constitutional requirements of transparency and public accountability. 
Given the often lucrative nature of public contracts, challenges to the 
lawfulness of government procurement awards have become a regular 
occurrence in South Africa. However, the setting aside of such an award does 
not automatically follow upon a finding of unlawfulness. For a number of 
reasons, a court may decline to set aside an unlawful government 
procurement award. 
This raises a number of interesting questions, particularly with regard to how 
such a decision may be reconciled with, and the implications this may have 
for, the principle of legality and the Rule of Law. This dissertation will address 
these issues, arguing that, ultimately, the concerns are resolved by 
appreciating the nature of the principle of legality, and the Rule of Law’s place 
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1.1   The judicial review of government procurement 
In South Africa the decision of a government department or agency to 
award a public tender for goods or services has become ‘a fruitful source of 
litigation’.1 So much so that the courts have expressed concern at the number 
of applications for the review and setting aside of tender awards that come 
before them.2 This is due in large part to the following three features of this area 
of the law. Firstly, the process by which a government tender is awarded 
constitutes administrative action3 for the purposes of the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act4 (the PAJA). Secondly, unsuccessful tenderers have 
locus standi to challenge the award of a government tender.5 Thirdly, the legal 
framework of government procurement in South Africa is unsatisfactory in that 
it is ‘far from coherent or structured in any systematic way’.6 Ultimately, there is 
a ‘myriad [of] rules and regulations that apply to tenders’ from which 
unlawfulness in the award process may stem.7 
Government tender awards are generally challenged by way of judicial 
review, with the review and setting aside of the award being the remedy most 
sought after.8 Litigation concerning the award of a government tender 
typically involves an unsuccessful tenderer complaining of some defect in the 
award of the tender sufficient to render the award unlawful and invalid, with a 
                                                          
1 Moseme Road Construction CC and Others v King Civil Engineering Contractors (Pty) Ltd and 
Another 2010 (4) SA 359 (SCA) para 1. 
2 South African Post Office v De Lacy 2009 (5) SA 255 (SCA) para 7. 
3 Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO and Others 2003 (2) SA 460 (SCA) para 5. 
4 Act 3 of 2000. 
5 Sanyathi Civil Engineering and Construction (Pty) Ltd and Others v Ethekwini Municipality and 
Others (KZP) unreported case no 7538/11 (30 September 2011) para 109. 
6 Geo Quinot ‘Enforcement of Procurement Law from a South African Perspective’ (2011) 6 
Public Procurement Law Review 193 at 194. 




view to having the award set aside and, ideally, being awarded the contract 
themselves.9 
In the event that a court finds a government tender to have been 
awarded unlawfully it must declare that award invalid. This is mandated by the 
Constitution.10 The court must then grant, in line with the PAJA, ‘any order that 
is just and equitable’.11 Typically, the courts at this stage will be concerned with 
whether or not to set aside the unlawful award, ‘the order that the court would 
usually give in the event that a ground of review is shown to exist’.12 
1.2   The judicial discretion to set aside unlawful tender awards 
The setting aside of an unlawful government tender award does not 
automatically follow upon a finding of invalidity. Rather, the court has a 
discretion whether or not to set it aside, with the implication being that the 
court may choose not to do so. As the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in 
Chairperson: Standing Tender Committee and Others v JFE Sapela Electronics 
(Pty) Ltd and Others13 stated: ‘In appropriate circumstances a court will 
decline, in the exercise of its discretion, to set aside an invalid administrative 
act’.14 
In such a situation the unsuccessful tenderer will be left ‘without any 
effective remedy’.15 This is despite both the breach of its right to just 
administrative action and its ultimate success in challenging the lawfulness and 
validity of the award in question. Furthermore, the unlawful tender award will 
stand and the contract will be allowed to run its course. The public authority in 
question would then also have acted outside the scope of its powers, 
seemingly without consequence. 
                                                          
9 Ibid. 
10 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 172(1)(a). 
11 S 8(1). 
12 J R de Ville Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa revised 1 ed (2005) 336. 
13 2008 (2) SA 638 (SCA). 
14 Ibid para 28. 
15 Moseme supra note 1 para 1. 
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1.3   The Rule of Law and the principle of legality 
In South Africa the Rule of Law is a foundational value of the Constitution.16 
As is now well-known, in Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater 
Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and Others17 the 
Constitutional Court (CC) drew upon the Rule of Law to assert the 
‘fundamental principle…that the exercise of public power is only legitimate 
where lawful’.18 This principle is, of course, the principle of legality.19 It holds that 
‘the Legislature and Executive in every sphere are constrained by the principle 
that they may exercise no power and perform no function beyond that 
conferred on them by law’.20 In other words, ‘the exercise of power must be 
authorised by law’.21 Accordingly, the exercise of all public power is subject to 
judicial control based on constitutional grounds.22 
Importantly, ‘[t]he logical concomitant of this is that an action performed 
without lawful authority is illegal or ultra vires – that is to say, beyond the powers 
of the administrator’.23 Public functionaries may therefore not do anything in 
their capacity as such unless they are authorised to do so. Should they act 
beyond the limits of their authority those actions will be unlawful and invalid. 
Furthermore, the courts are obliged to uphold the Rule of Law.24 
1.4   Research question 
In light of the above, how can we make sense of the courts’ discretion to 
allow unlawful government tender awards to stand? After all, doing so would 
seem to undermine both the principle of legality and the Rule of Law. The 
difficulty in allowing unlawful administrative decisions to stand was 
                                                          
16 Constitution, 1996 s 1(c). 
17 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC). 
18 Ibid para 56. 
19 Cora Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 122. 
20 Fedsure supra note 17 para 58. 
21 Hoexter op cit note 19 at 255. 
22 Geo Quinot ‘Towards Effective Judicial Review of State Commercial Activity’ (2009) 3 TSAR 
436 at 437. Also see Hoexter op cit note 19 at 121-3. 
23 Ibid at 255-6. 
24 Constitution, 1996 s 1(c) read with s 165(2). 
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acknowledged by the CC in Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd and Others v 
Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd and Others.25 In what is now a frequently cited 
passage in cases concerning unlawful tender awards26 the court stated that 
‘[t]he apparent anomaly that an unlawful act can produce legally effective 
consequences is not one that admits easy and consistently logical solutions’.27 
Furthermore, ‘[t]he rule of law must never be relinquished, but the 
circumstances of each case must be examined in order to determine whether 
factual certainty requires some amelioration of legality and, if so, to what 
extent’.28 
The court does not explicitly state that allowing unlawful administrative 
acts to stand undermines the Rule of Law. However, this is certainly implied. In 
what way, then, is the Rule of Law undermined, if any? If it is undermined in 
some way, is this permissible? More explicitly, the court seems to regard the 
principle of legality as ‘ameliorated’ when it is breached by some action which 
is not then set aside on review. This is a peculiar claim, as it suggests that part 
of the principle of legality is the requirement that unlawful administrative acts 
be set aside. 
Allowing unlawful tender awards to stand therefore seems to conflict with, 
and have implications for, the principle of legality and, accordingly, the Rule 
of Law. Given this apparent conflict, we may ask the following questions. Firstly, 
is it appropriate to allow an unlawful tender award to stand, and how may we 
justify the courts doing so? Secondly, in what ways are the principle of legality 
and the Rule of Law affected by doing so, if any? This dissertation will attempt 
to answer these questions. 
                                                          
25 2011 (4) SA 113 (CC). 
26 This case concerned not the award of a government tender, but the unlawful granting of 
prospecting rights by the State. However, judgments concerning unlawful government tender 
awards frequently cite this case at the remedial stage of the enquiry. See for example Joubert 
Galpin Searle Inc and Others v Road Accident Fund and Others 2014 (4) SA 148 (ECP) para 97. 




It is perhaps important at the outset to note that the fact that the courts 
may have a discretion to allow unlawful tender awards to stand does not 
answer either of these questions. That the courts have such a discretion is, after 
all, merely a descriptive fact which anticipates the questions posed above, to 
which the courts have not provided answers. At most, the courts have justified 
allowing unlawful tender awards to stand with reference to difficulties 
associated with setting the award aside,29 and the public interest.30 These 
justifications are, however, rather thin, and do not resolve the deeper 
theoretical concerns alluded to above. 
On the issue of the implications that allowing an unlawful tender award to 
stand may have for the Rule of Law and principle of legality, the courts have 
provided no discussion at all. Discerning any potential implications is also by no 
means apparent. It involves a theoretical enquiry into both the nature of the 
Rule of Law and the courts’ understanding of it. This is no easy task. Discussions 
concerning the meaning of the Rule of Law are generally fraught with 
difficulty.31 However, given its importance, it is a debate which, as Price notes, 
‘South African lawyers cannot contentedly abstain from’.32 
1.5   The relevance of government procurement 
Of course, allowing any unlawful administrative act to stand would present 
similar difficulties, if not the same, as those involved in allowing unlawful tender 
awards to stand. The question which then arises is why one would choose to 
answer the questions identified above within a broader discussion of 
government procurement. Several reasons may briefly be proffered for this. 
Firstly, as has already been pointed out, these awards frequently give rise to 
legal challenge. Furthermore, by the time a court is called upon to set aside 
                                                          
29 AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v The Chief Executive Officer 
of the South African Social Security Agency and Others (NGHC) unreported case no 7447/12 
(28 August 2012) para 78. 
30 Millennium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson, Tender Board: Limpopo Province 
and Others 2008 (2) SA 481 (SCA) para 28. 




an unlawful tender award, work on the contract may have already 
commenced. This may make it difficult for the court to set aside the award, 
giving rise to those very problems with which this dissertation is concerned. As 
such, unlawful tender awards provide an excellent case-study in which to 
address the subject matter of this dissertation. 
Secondly, despite the subject’s obvious importance,33 the study of 
government procurement in South Africa has generally been neglected.34 
Literature on the topic is therefore sparse.35 By addressing the subject matter 
of the dissertation within a broader discussion of government procurement, a 
contribution to the subject can hopefully be made. 
1.6   Structure of the dissertation 
Chapter 2 will discuss the development of subjecting government 
procurement decisions to judicial scrutiny – a development which necessarily 
precedes the decision of whether or not to set aside an unlawful tender award. 
In particular, the jurisdictions of the United States and England will be discussed. 
A discussion of these jurisdictions is instructive for the following reasons. First, 
English law has had a ‘commanding role in South Africa’s constitutional history’ 
and the United States bears ‘constitutional similarities with South Africa 
today’.36 Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, these jurisdictions represent 
divergent views on the issue of subjecting government procurement to judicial 
scrutiny, informed in large part by conflicting underlying policy choices. The 
methodology employed will entail a historical comparison of the judicial 
approaches of these jurisdictions to recognising the locus standi of aggrieved 
bidders to challenge government tender awards, and the underlying policy 
concerns informing the decision of whether or not to do so. 
                                                          
33 Phoebe Bolton The Law of Government Procurement in South Africa (2007) v. 
34 Ibid. See also Geo Quinot and Sue Arrowsmith Public Procurement Regulation in Africa (2013) 
xiii. 
35 Bolton op cit note 33 at v. 
36 Hoexter op cit note 19 at 3. 
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Chapter 3 will look at how the courts determine whether or not the award 
of a government tender is unlawful. This is important as a finding of unlawfulness 
is necessarily anterior to the decision of whether or not to set that award aside. 
The determination of lawfulness in government procurement has been a 
controversial topic in need of clarification for some time. On some occasions, 
the courts have demanded strict compliance with the procurement 
framework, whereas in others non-compliance has been permitted. Until 
recently there has also been a tendency to conflate the lawfulness and 
remedial enquiries, which has only recently been rectified in the seminal case 
of AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief 
Executive Officer of the South African Social Security Agency and Others.37 
Chapter 4 will look at how the courts decide whether or not to set aside 
unlawful government procurement awards. This determination typically 
involves a balancing of various interests. Given that the courts have a duty to 
provide effective relief38 there is a clear conflict between this duty and the 
decision to allow an unlawful tender award to stand. In light of this conflict, this 
chapter will look at whether the decision not to set aside an unlawful tender 
award is appropriate, and how this decision may be justified. 
Chapter 5 will seek to understand what effect, if any, allowing unlawful 
tender awards to stand may have on the principle of legality and the Rule of 
Law. If the Rule of Law is somehow undermined by such a decision, we will 
consider how this may be permissible given the Rule of Law’s constitutional 
significance. In answering these questions, the development and requirements 
of the principle of legality will be considered. This chapter will also consider the 
Rule of Law from a theoretical perspective, as well as how it functions in 
modern South African constitutional law. 
Chapter 6 will, in conclusion, provide a summary of the main arguments 
raised in the dissertation. 
                                                          
37 2014 (1) SA 604 (CC). 




THE REVIEWABILITY OF GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
2.1   Introduction 
Challenges to government procurement awards have become a regular 
occurrence in South African courts.1 Indeed, the courts often lament their 
being ‘placed in an invidious position in exercising their administrative law 
discretion’ upon finding such an award to be unlawful.2 Depending on the 
scale and significance of the tender in question, it may be incredibly difficult 
to determine whether setting aside the award would be appropriate, despite 
its unlawfulness.3 
Litigation involving government procurement awards has a number of 
negative consequences. It adversely affects those contractors who rely 
heavily on government contracts to sustain their business.4 As Pierson notes, 
‘[f]rom the successful bidder’s point of view, the contract award created a firm 
obligation which bound him to begin performance or risk cancellation of the 
contract for default’.5 A challenge to the award makes the position of the 
winning bidder far less secure. In addition, contractors may to a large extent 
rely on receiving government contracts, especially ‘where such contracts are 
                                                          
1 South African Post Office v De Lacy and Another 2009 (5) SA 255 (SCA) para 1; Moseme Road 
Construction CC and Others v King Civil Engineering Contractors (Pty) Ltd and Another 2010 
(4) SA 359 (SCA) para 1; AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v The 
Chief Executive Officer, South African Social Security Agency and Others 2013 (4) SA 557 (SCA) 
para 1. 
2 Moseme supra note 1 para 1. 
3 AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief Executive Officer of the 
South African Social Security Agency and Others 2014 (1) SA 604 (CC) para 96. 
4 Sue Arrowsmith, John Linarelli, and Don Wallace, Jr Regulating Public Procurement: National 
and International Perspectives (2000) 9. 
5 Richard R Pierson ‘Standing to Seek Judicial Review of Government Contract Awards: Its 
Origins, Rationale, and Effect on the Procurement Process’ (1970) 12 Boston College Industrial 
and Commercial Law Review 1 at 24-5. 
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for complex items which have no market other than the government agency 
that procured them’.6 
Most significant, however, are the adverse effects the delay in the 
procurement of goods and services has on the intended beneficiaries,7 
especially where the implementation of development and social policy is 
concerned.8 As Arrowsmith notes, government procurement is often utilised ‘to 
support general social, political and economic objectives of government not 
directly connected with the actual purchase’.9 This development has 
therefore had, and continues to have, significant consequences for the 
procurement regime itself and the implementation of public programmes. 
2.2   The historical development of subjecting government procurement to 
judicial review 
2.2.1 Immunity from review 
Historically, and across jurisdictions, there has generally been a reluctance 
to subject government procurement decisions to judicial review. The reasons 
for this differ, often relating to differences in institutional design. For example, 
the reluctance in England stems in large part from concerns of ‘constitutional 
competence’,10 meaning that those courts have thought it inappropriate to 
review decisions thought to be the sole preserve of a different and, 
importantly, elected arm of the state. In the United States, however, the initial 
reluctance to subject government procurement to judicial review stemmed 
mostly from the concern that to do so would significantly curtail government 
effectiveness.11 
                                                          
6 Ibid at 25. 
7 Ibid. See also AllPay (CC) supra note 3 para 4 where the court stated that 
‘procurement...palpably implicates socio-economic rights’. 
8 Arrowsmith et al Regulating Public Procurement op cit note 4 at 10-11 and 257; Phoebe Bolton 
‘The Use of Government Procurement as an Instrument of Policy’ (2004) 121(1) SALJ 619 at 624. 
9 Sue Arrowsmith Government Procurement and Judicial Review (1988) 81. 
10 Geo Quinot ‘Towards Effective Judicial Review of State Commercial Activity’ (2009) 3 TSAR 
436 at 437. 
11 Richard E Speidel ‘Judicial and Administrative Review of Government Contract Awards’ 37 
Law and Contemporary Problems 63 at 74. 
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Arrowsmith, writing from the perspective of common law jurisdictions, has 
noted that historically there has been a tendency to regard government 
procurement as ‘substantially immune from judicial review’.12 The reasons for 
this are that, firstly, ‘contractual capacity is not peculiar to governments but is 
shared by most legal persons’.13 Secondly, it is typically the ‘ordinary private 
law’ which regulates those contracts entered into by government.14 Thirdly, the 
decision to contract is perceived as consensual whereas ‘governmental 
powers to regulate...are seen to be characterised by an element of 
compulsion’.15 Finally, government contracting has been regarded as being 
of a ‘commercial’ or ‘business’ nature.16 
Arrowsmith also notes the following theoretical difficulty in subjecting 
government procurement to judicial review. Judicial review is generally 
regarded as having a statutory basis, meaning that ‘the courts are...simply 
ensuring that the government does not exceed the...limitations of the power 
conferred by the legislature’.17 However, where the source of the 
government’s power to contract arises not from statute, but some other 
common law power, ‘the traditional juristic explanation for judicial review has 
no application’.18 
It is doubtful whether the fact that there are contractual or commercial 
aspects to government procurement should dispose of the issue of whether 
such decisions should be free from judicial scrutiny. In procuring goods and 
services, the state acts in the public interest and utilises public funds. As such, 
the public has a very real interest in how such contracts are awarded. This 
supports the view that accountability through judicial scrutiny of these 
decisions is in fact warranted. Furthermore, the basis of the theoretical difficulty 
                                                          
12 Arrowsmith op cit note 9 at 8. 
13 Ibid at 13. 
14 Ibid at 14. 
15 Ibid at 16. 
16 Ibid at 19. 




noted above would also be far less problematic in a jurisdiction founded on 
constitutional, as opposed to parliamentary, sovereignty. 
2.2.2 South Africa 
South Africa’s own historical reluctance to subject government 
procurement to judicial review stems primarily from its pre-democratic 
experience of parliamentary sovereignty. Prior to 1994 the procurement 
process in South Africa was to a large extent regulated in terms of the State 
Tender Board Act.19 A perusal of this Act shows that the procurement process 
was by no means fair, equitable, or transparent. The Act allowed for the 
establishment of the State Tender Board20 which had the ‘power to procure 
supplies and services for the State’.21 Among the more notable powers given 
to the State Tender Board in order to perform this function were, firstly, that it 
could ‘in any manner it may deem fit, invite offers and determine the manner 
in which and the conditions subject to which such offers shall be made’22 and, 
secondly, ‘without giving reasons therefor, accept or reject any offer for the 
conclusion of an agreement’.23 
As De la Harpe notes, not only was procurement to some extent shrouded 
in secrecy,24 but complainants were often without legal recourse.25 
Unsuccessful tenderers did not have rights to information or to be given 
reasons.26 Furthermore, ‘[s]ubstantive principles of public procurement like 
transparency, accountability and fairness and equitability were not adhered 
to’.27 Lastly, the government of the time could shield itself from ‘public and 
legal scrutiny’ by relying on what it deemed to be the ‘public interest’.28 Clearly 
                                                          
19 Act 86 of 1968. 
20 S 2. 
21 S 4(1). 
22 S 4(1)(b). 
23 S 4(1)(d). 
24 Stephanus Petrus le Roux De la Harpe Public Procurement Law: A Comparative Analysis 
(unpublished doctoral thesis, University of South Africa, 2009) at 518. 
25 Ibid at 519. 
26 Ibid at 268. 




the pre-1994 procurement framework in no way resembled the current 
procurement regime which, according to the Constitution,29 must be ‘fair, 
equitable [and] transparent’,30 and which forms part of a public administration 
which requires both accountability31 and transparency.32 
The recent development in subjecting government procurement to 
judicial review, and recognising the locus standi of unsuccessful bidders, took 
some time. This was even after the coming into force of the interim33 and final 
Constitutions, and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act34 (‘the PAJA’). 
As in other jurisdictions, there was initially some reluctance to these 
developments. However, unlike in other jurisdictions, this reluctance was not 
due to issues pertaining to theoretical justifications for judicial review and 
common law powers to contract. Rather, it had to do with appreciating the 
newly entrenched right to just administrative action and the definition of 
‘administrative action’ in the PAJA. 
The PAJA defines administrative action as 
‘any decision taken, or failure to take a decision by an organ of state, 
when exercising a power in terms of the Constitution or a provincial 
constitution; or exercising a public power or performing a public function 
in terms of any legislation; or a natural or juristic person, other than an 
organ of state, when exercising a public power or performing a public 
function in terms of an empowering provision, which adversely affects the 
rights of any person and which has a direct, external legal effect’.35 
A number of early constitutional era decisions grappled with the issue of 
whether or not the procurement process met this definition of administrative 
action. In Umfolozi Transport (Edms) Bpk v Minister van Vervoer en Andere,36 
the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) held that the process preceding the 
                                                          
29 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
30 S 217. 
31 S 195(f). 
32 S 195(g). 
33 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. 
34 Act 3 of 2000. 
35 S 1. 
36 [1997] 2 All SA 548 (A). 
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conclusion of a tender contract was administrative in nature. The court 
reasoned as follows: 
‘Wat kontraksluiting hier voorafgegaan het, behels suiwer administratiewe 
handelinge en beslissings aan die kant van die betrokke amptenary, en 
veral die Raad, en boonop in ’n sfeer wat met die besteding van 
openbare gelde in die openbare belang deur ’n openbare liggaam te 
doen het. Natuurlik is die onderdaan in hierdie omstandighede op ’n 
regverdige en billike prosedure geregtig’.37 
This reasoning was later reaffirmed by the SCA in Transnet Ltd v Goodman 
Bros (Pty) Ltd.38 The court held that even though Transnet was a private 
company the government exercised ‘ultimate control’ over it by virtue of the 
fact that it owned ‘all the shares in it’.39 Furthermore, Transnet still provided a 
‘general service to the public’ and had a ‘near-monopoly over rail transport’.40 
Accordingly, ‘the actions of Transnet in calling for and adjudicating tenders 
constituted administrative action’.41 
That the process of government procurement constitutes administrative 
action is undoubtedly correct. Firstly, it is authorised by s 217 of the Constitution 
and accordingly constitutes the ‘exercise of a power in terms of the 
Constitution’.42 Secondly, it utilises public funding and is done in the public 
interest thus making it a ‘public power’ and a ‘public function’.43 As the 
Constitutional Court (CC) noted in Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, 
Eastern Cape,44 
‘when a tender board evaluates and awards a tender, it acts within the 
domain of administrative law. Its decision in awarding or refusing a tender 
constitutes an administrative action. That is so because the decision is 
taken by an organ of state which wields public power or performs a public 
function in terms of the Constitution or legislation and the decision 
                                                          
37 At 552-3. Translated as: ‘What preceded the contract here involved purely administrative 
actions and decisions on the part of the officials involved, and especially the Council, and also 
involved the expenditure of public money in the public interest by a public body. Of course, 
the subject in this situation is entitled to a fair and equitable procedure’. 
38 2001 (1) SA 853 (SCA). 
39 Ibid para 8. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid para 9. 
42 PAJA s 1. 
43 Ibid. 
44 2007 (3) SA 121 (CC). 
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materially and directly affects the legal interests or rights of tenderers 
concerned’.45 
In Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO and Others46 the SCA once again 
asserted what it by now regarded as ‘obvious’, namely that 
‘the tender process constitute[s] “administrative action” under the 
Constitution…which entitled the appellant…to a lawful and procedurally 
fair process and an outcome, where its rights were affected or threatened, 
justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it’.47 
The most significant consequence of the fact that the government 
procurement process constitutes administrative action is that it is reviewable in 
terms of any of the grounds listed in s 6 of the PAJA.48 The next logical issue then 
is who may apply for the review of a government procurement award 
believed to be unlawful. Naturally, the fact that government procurement 
awards are reviewable will be of little consequence to a person aggrieved 
thereby if they are not entitled to challenge the award. 
Typically, it will be an unsuccessful bidder, aggrieved at having lost the 
contract tendered for, who will want to challenge the award.49 Initially, the 
issue of locus standi of an unsuccessful tenderer was a contentious one, 
particularly in relation to a request for information regarding the awarding of a 
tender. The reason for this can be attributed to the wording of s 24 of the interim 
Constitution, which seemed to make the rights to lawful administrative action,50 
procedurally fair administrative action,51 and to be furnished with reasons52 
contingent on the applicant’s rights, interests, or legitimate expectations being 
affected or threatened.53 
                                                          
45 Ibid para 21. 
46 2003 (2) SA 460 (SCA). 
47 Ibid para 5. 
48 S 6(1). 
49 Moseme supra note 1 para 1. 
50 S 24(a). 
51 S 24(b). 
52 S 24(c). 
53 S 24. 
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An early example of the courts’ reluctance to grant unsuccessful 
tenderers locus standi is SA Metal Machinery Co Ltd v Transnet Ltd54 where 
Heher J stated as follows: 
‘[T]he applicant falls into that category of tenderers who prepare and 
submit their offers entirely at their own risk and who…does not even have 
a legitimate expectation that his tender will be considered at all…Unless 
and until his tender is accepted, a person in the position of the applicant 
is effectively a stranger to the tender process and therefore to the 
administrative action. The applicant’s interest…does not in my view 
possess the qualities which merit constitutional protection against unlawful 
administrative action such as to bring it within section 33(1) [of the 
Constitution]. For the same reason the award of a tender in the 
circumstances under consideration…does not entitle the applicant to 
reasons, either for the granting of a tender or for its own lack of success in 
that regard’.55 
A contrary view was taken in Aquafund (Pty) Ltd v Premier of the Province 
of the Western Cape.56 This case concerned not an application for the judicial 
review of a tender award, but an application in terms of s 23 of the interim 
Constitution for the furnishing of information and documents relating to a 
tender.57 On this issue Traverso J (as she then was) held as follows: 
‘[T]he consideration of the tender was an administrative action and...the 
applicant was accordingly entitled to lawful administrative action as 
meant in section 24 of the [interim] Constitution. If the applicant is entitled 
to lawful administrative action, it must, in my view, follow that it will be 
entitled to all such information as may be reasonably required by it to 
establish whether or not its right to lawful administrative action has been 
violated. The applicant will reasonably require this information to make an 
informed decision on the future conduct of the matter’.58 
The approach taken in SA Metal Machinery was later rejected and the 
approach of Aquafund endorsed by the SCA in Goodman Bros.59 Since then 
the South African courts have in a number of cases held that unsuccessful 
bidders have locus standi to challenge the award of a tender. In Olitzki 
                                                          
54 (WLD) unreported case no 30825/97 (22 March 1998). 
55 Ibid. 
56 1997 (7) BCLR 907 (C). 
57 Ibid at 909. 
58 Ibid at 915-16. 
59 Transnet v Goodman Bros supra note 38 para 43, 10-12. 
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Property Holdings v State Tender Board and Another60 the SCA accepted that 
the ‘irregular, unreasonable and arbitrary conduct in the tender process 
certainly breached the plaintiff’s rights in s 24 [of the interim Constitution]’.61 
Furthermore, the SCA in Eskom Holdings Ltd v New Reclamation Group (Pty) 
Ltd62 noted that ‘[o]rdinarily, where there has been a reviewable irregularity in 
the award of the tender, an unsuccessful tenderer would be entitled to call for 
the award to be set aside’.63 
Related to the issue of locus standi is the requirement in the PAJA that an 
act will only constitute administrative action if it ‘adversely affects the rights of 
any person and which has a direct, external legal effect’.64 The import of this 
section was considered in Grey’s Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd and Others v 
Minister of Public Works and Others65 where the SCA held that this section 
meant that ‘administrative action is action that has the capacity to affect 
legal rights’.66 This paragraph was relied on by the court in Sanyathi Civil 
Engineering and Construction (Pty) Ltd and Others v Ethekwini Municipality and 
Others67 in recognising that unsuccessful tenderers have locus standi to 
challenge the award of a tender.68 This view also accords with the reasoning 
adopted in Aquafund where Traverso J alluded to the fact that unless an 
unsuccessful tenderer can approach a court they may not be able to know 
whether their rights to just administrative action have in fact been infringed.69 
Accordingly, as it stands the South African position is that ‘unsuccessful 
                                                          
60 2001 (3) SA 1247 (SCA). 
61 Ibid para 33. 
62 2009 (4) SA 628 (SCA). 
63 Ibid para 11. 
64 S 1. 
65 2005 (6) SA 313 (SCA). 
66 Ibid para 23. 
67 (KZP) unreported case no 7538/2011 (30 September 2011). 
68 Ibid para 109. 
69 Aquafund supra note 56 at 915. However, it should be borne in mind that the court in this 




tenderers…automatically have locus standi to challenge the award of the 
tender’.70 
Other countries have generally not subjected their procurement regimes 
to the level of judicial scrutiny that South Africa has. As Quinot notes, ‘South 
African law has probably gone further than most other common law systems 
in accepting generally that the adjudication and award of all public tenders 
amount to administrative action subject to judicial review’.71 As a result, the 
judicial review of tender awards has become ‘a central constitutional 
mechanism to control the exercise of public power’ in this area of the law.72 
2.3   Judicial review of government procurement in comparative context 
2.3.1   The United States 
The well-documented experience in the United States provides a good 
illustration of the policy issues involved in subjecting government procurement 
to judicial review.73 In several cases prior to 1970, challenges to procurement 
decisions were regularly dismissed. Perkins v Lukens Steel Co74 concerned a 
challenge to an erroneous wage determination made by the Secretary of 
Labour pursuant to the relevant procurement legislation.75 In the Supreme 
Court’s view 
‘[t]he Secretary's responsibility is to superior executive and legislative 
authority. Respondents have no standing in court to enforce that 
responsibility or to represent the public's interest in the Secretary's 
compliance with the Act’.76 
                                                          
70 Sanyathi supra note 67 para 109. 
71 Quinot op cit note 10 at 439. 
72 Ibid at 436. 
73 See Pierson op cit note 5; Speidel op cit note 11; John S Pachter ‘The Need for a 
Comprehensive Judicial Remedy for Bid Protests’ (1986) 16 Public Contract Law Journal 47; 
Darryl A Rice ‘Judicial Review for Disappointed Bidders on Federal Government Contracts’ 
(1972) 26 Southwestern Law Journal 384. 
74 310 US 113 (1940). 
75 Ibid at 117. 
76 Ibid at 129. 
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In Lind v Staats77 the plaintiffs sought the cancellation of a government 
contract, as well as the restraining of any performance of the contract 
pending the outcome of the challenge.78 The court, in denying the relief 
sought, referred to the above dictum in Perkins.79 Furthermore, the court noted 
that 
‘[t]he relief sought by plaintiffs creates great policy problems and brings 
into play the distinctions between powers of government. It does not 
require much imagination to anticipate the chaos which would be 
caused if the bidding procedure under every government contract was 
subject to review by court to ascertain if it was fairly and properly done, 
and the corresponding damage and delay which would be done to 
government business if the injunctive power of the court was used to stay 
contractual activities pending judicial decision. Therefore, the Court 
concludes that the evidence fails to establish that the plaintiffs have 
standing to sue, or that there is any strong likelihood that they would 
succeed in their action’.80 
As Pierson notes, the primary impediment to disappointed bidders 
obtaining relief was that they were denied locus standi.81 This position was 
justified on the following two bases. Firstly, ‘the procurement statutes were 
enacted for the benefit of the public and were not intended to confer any 
enforceable rights on individual bidders’.82 Secondly, ‘judicial review of 
government contracts would disrupt the even and expeditious functioning of 
government’ and cause ‘damage and delay...to government business’.83 
However, as the scale and importance of government procurement 
increased, it was recognised that 
‘more individuals are affected by or involved in the procurement process 
and...are becoming increasingly concerned about whether that process 
is administered fairly and in accordance with the relevant statutes and 
regulations, rather than in accordance with the well-intentioned desires of 
a government department or agency’.84 
                                                          
77 289 F Supp 182 (ND Cal 1968). 
78 Ibid at 184. 
79 Ibid at 185. 
80 Ibid at 186. 
81 Pierson op cit note 5 at 2. 
82 Ibid at 8. 
83 Ibid at 41-2. 
84 Ibid at 5. 
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Denying disappointed bidders locus standi to challenge government 
procurement awards on the basis that bidders had no right to a contract also 
became increasingly unsatisfactory.85 In the seminal decision of Scanwell 
Laboratories, Inc v Shaffer,86 which concerned bids to the Federal Aviation 
Administration for aircraft landing systems,87 the right of an unsuccessful bidder 
to challenge a government contract award was recognised.88 After a lengthy 
analysis of the legal decisions concerning standing, the court noted that 
‘[t]he public interest in preventing the granting of contracts through 
arbitrary or capricious action can properly be vindicated through a suit 
brought by one who suffers injury as a result of the illegal activity, but the 
suit itself is brought in the public interest by one acting essentially as a 
“private attorney general”’.89 
As Pierson notes, the idea that an unsuccessful bidder acts for the public 
interest is ‘an obvious fiction which only those who stand to gain economically 
from its acceptance can embrace as a reflection of reality’.90 Unsuccessful 
bidders challenging decisions to award government contracts clearly do so 
out of their own economic interests. Denying this reality and dressing up the 
justification for locus standi in the clothes of the ‘public interest’ distracts us 
from the essential question, which Pierson frames as follows: 
‘[I]s the public interest in having...procurement...both committed by fair 
and established rules, and at the same time spent in the most economical 
and efficient manner, best served by permitting unsuccessful bidders to 
contest the legality of government contract awards?’91 
The experience in the United States, like in South Africa, illustrates a 
jurisdiction discarding its reluctance to subject government procurement to 
judicial review and coming to appreciate the importance of accountability 
over concerns of government effectiveness. However, this view is not 
universally shared. As we will now see, the far more conservative approach in 
                                                          
85 Ibid at 9-10. 
86 424 F2d 859 (DC Cir 1970). 
87 Ibid at 860. 
88 Ibid at 876. 
89 Ibid at 864. 
90 Pierson op cit note 5 at 14. 
91 Ibid at 15. 
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England continues to pose problems, both practical and doctrinal, in this area 
of the law. 
2.3.2   England 
The availability of judicial review as a remedy in tender disputes in England 
‘has caused difficulty for as long as judicial review has existed in anything like 
its modern form’.92 This aspect of English administrative law has been described 
as ‘overly complex’ and is considered a diversion away ‘from a proper 
consideration of important substantive issues’.93 
In England procurement awards are significantly less amenable to review 
than in South Africa. English courts have in a number of cases held that for a 
tender decision to be rendered amenable to review there must be a sufficient 
‘public law element’.94 What this element is, however, is not entirely clear. This 
has resulted in a test which is ‘insufficiently clear to be workable and in some 
cases produces the undesirable result of limiting the proper reach of public 
law’.95 The following cases will illustrate this. 
R v Lord Chancellor’s Department Ex p Hibbit and Saunders96 concerned 
the application for ‘judicial review of a decision of Lord Chancellor…to award 
a contract for court reporting services for the Chelmsford group of courts’.97 
The applicants argued that they were treated unfairly in two respects with 
regard to the tender procedure. Firstly, they argued that they had been 
disqualified on the basis of secret criteria, and as a result had been prevented 
from making a second, reduced bid whilst other tenderers were so allowed. 
Secondly, they argued that a criterion of the tender, which required tenderers 
to account for the price of staff, had been secretly waived. As a result, those 
                                                          
92 S H Bailey ‘Judicial Review of Contracting Decisions’ (2007) Public Law 444. 
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94 See S H Bailey ‘Judicial Review and the Tendering Process. A note on R (on the application 
of Menai Collect Ltd and North West Commercial Services Ltd) v Department of Constitutional 
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tenderers who did not account for this in their bid were able to price lower than 
those in the applicant’s position who had so accounted. 
The court ultimately concluded that ‘the procedures here followed by the 
respondent were, in part at least, unfair’.98 The applicants had a legitimate 
expectation ‘that tenderers would not be able, subsequently, to submit 
reduced bids’.99 As other tenderers were invited to submit lower bids the 
applicants were prejudiced. Furthermore, the fact that the applicants 
submitted their bid ‘on a basis which the respondent chose not to maintain’ 
also resulted in unfairness.100 
Having found that the applicants were treated unfairly in the tender 
process the court then considered whether or not they were entitled to judicial 
review. The court accepted as common cause the following: first, ‘that the 
Lord Chancellor was susceptible to review’,101 ‘[s]econdly, that that 
susceptibility exists only in relation to those of his decisions which are either in 
some way statutorily underpinned or involve some other sufficient public law 
element as to which there is no universal test’,102 and ‘[t]hirdly, that the test to 
be applied is…"[t]o look at the subject-matter of the decision which it is 
suggested should be subject to judicial review and by looking at that subject-
matter then come to a decision as to whether judicial review is 
appropriate"’.103 
The court, per Rose LJ, accepted that the commercial nature of the 
procurement did not in itself ‘take the case outside the ambit of public law’.104 
However, the court ultimately concluded that the subject-matter of the case 
at hand was not one where judicial review was appropriate. The court 
dismissed the notion that procurement decisions could be equated with, for 










example, immigration decisions, ‘control of which is the especial province of 
the State and where, in consequence, a sufficient public law element is 
apparent’.105 Surprisingly, the court refused the application for review even 
though the court found that the applicants had been treated unfairly.106 
The court also noted, in a concurring judgment per Waller J, that 
‘[i]n considering whether a decision can be judicially reviewed, it is critical 
to identify the decision and the nature of the attack on it. Unless there is a 
public law element in the decision, and unless the allegation involves 
suggested breaches of duties or obligations owed as a matter of public 
law, the decision will not be reviewable’.107 
Accordingly, the applicants had to show that they had ‘rights to which 
they were entitled as a matter of public law’, and that these rights were 
infringed.108 Such a public law obligation did not necessarily follow from the 
fact that ‘the Lord Chancellor's Department is a governmental body carrying 
out governmental functions and appointing persons to public office’.109 There 
must be ‘some other element that gives rise in addition to a public law 
obligation’.110 Waller J noted that the obligations created when a government 
enters into a contract are those created in terms of the contract. Accordingly, 
the obligations will be private law obligations. Something more, namely a 
public law element, is required for additional public law obligations. 
The fact that the government was acting in terms of a statute did not 
necessarily provide an additional public law element.111 In some 
circumstances it may, but this would depend on the wording of the particular 
statute. Crucially, ‘to have a right which can…be the subject of review that 
right must flow from the statute if it is to a statue that one has had to look for 
providing the public law element’.112 In other words, the statute itself must 











impose public law obligations. Ultimately the court found that the ‘procedure 
itself was no different from any other procedure adopted in ordinary 
commercial contract situations’ and thus ‘lacked a sufficient public law 
element to found such relief’.113 
R (on the application of Menai Collect Ltd) v Department for 
Constitutional Affairs114 concerned ‘an application for judicial review…[of] a 
contract for the provision of “enforcement services” for Magistrates’ Courts on 
the Wales and Chester Circuit’.115 Notably, the contracts were entered into on 
the basis of a statutory power.116 The applicants contended that a report taken 
into consideration by the decision-maker was misleading; that information 
taken into account in coming to a decision to award the contract was in fact 
false; and that statistical information necessary to the enable a comparison 
between bidders was not taken into account in doing so.117 Furthermore, the 
subject matter of the decision involved a public law element due to the fact 
that ‘it was classically a decision relating to the identity of persons engaged to 
exercise coercive powers of the state’.118 
After a lengthy analysis of the case law relating to judicial review of 
procurement the court referred approvingly to the reasoning adopted in Hibbit 
and Saunders.119 The court concluded that, although the agency was 
exercising a statutory power, this by itself did ‘not confer the necessary public 
element to subject the decision criticised...to judicial review’.120 The court 
reasoned that 
‘the tender evaluation process was an essentially commercial process, 
notwithstanding the nature of the services which are to be the subject of 
the contract’ and that cases where a ‘true public law element’ was 
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present were those involving ‘bribery, corruption, implementation of 
unlawful policy and the like’.121 
The court noted that it was ‘inappropriate’ for the court to re-evaluate the 
tenders as it did not have the necessary ‘material or expertise…to “second 
guess” the judgment of the Panel’ which was ‘in the realm of commercial 
judgment’.122 The court thus explicitly acknowledged the issue of institutional 
competence as a factor which weighed against subjecting procurement 
decisions to judicial review. 
R (on the application of Gamesa Energy UK Ltd) v National Assembly for 
Wales123 concerned an application for the judicial review of a decision to lease 
forestry land to be used for the operation of wind farms.124 The claimant was 
excluded at the pre-qualification stage of the tender process on the strength 
of its ‘pre-qualification questionnaire’ and was accordingly not invited to 
tender its bid.125 
The claimant argued that its exclusion was ‘flawed, irrational and unfair, 
and/or…taken in breach of a legitimate expectation’.126 The claim of 
irrationality was based on the marking scheme applied to the pre-qualification 
questionnaire. Essentially, the claimant argued that this scheme was irrational 
in that ‘[i]t penalised the claimant…for disclosing too many developments 
which it had conducted in the past and for giving details of projects which 
were in a relatively early stage of development’.127 The defendants argued 
that they ‘were lawfully entitled to choose such a system’ which ‘was fairly and 
equally applied to all potential bidders’.128 
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Having concluded that the ‘power and authority’ of the defendants to 
embark on the tender process in question was sourced in statute,129 the court 
proceeded to the question of whether the decision challenged was open to 
judicial review. The court noted that the determination of whether or not any 
decision does in fact have the necessary public law element to make it 
susceptible to judicial review ‘is often as much a matter of feel, as deciding 
whether any criteria are met’.130 
The court referred approvingly to the approach taken in Hibbit and 
Saunders and Menai Collect, thus reaffirming the centrality of a sufficient 
public law element to the enquiry.131 With regard to the requirement of a 
public law element, the court noted that it is not always easy to determine 
whether or not this is present in a particular case.132 The court also noted that 
it was significant that the necessary public law element need be ‘sufficient’.133 
The court accepted that the exercise of statutory powers and the expenditure 
of public funds were both public law elements, but the question remained 
whether or not this was enough to bring ‘the claim within the purview of 
challenge on public law grounds’, as a challenge of fraud ‘undoubtedly’ 
would.134 
The court ultimately held that the defendants ‘were not obliged by 
statute’ to carry out the pre-qualification process complained of, and that the 
defendant enjoyed significant latitude in how it went about this process in the 
event that it chose to do so, ‘provided it was in good faith and untainted by 
corruption et cetera’.135 In the present case there were ‘no sufficient public 
law aspects to the challenge to make it amenable to judicial review’.136 The 
court did not go so far as to exclude the possibility of a public law challenge 
                                                          
129 Ibid para 34. 
130 Ibid para 13. 
131 Ibid para 61-2. 
132 Ibid para 66-7. 
133 Ibid para 67. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid para 74. 
136 Ibid para 77. 
26 
 
to the tendering process on the basis of irrationality, but noted that such 
situations would be ‘rare’.137 
The court also noted that there were sound reasons of policy ‘why matters 
of this sort should not generally be open to challenge on the ground of 
irrationality’, namely that ‘[t]he extension of public law into matters of that kind 
could be regarded a creating an unreasonable impediment to impose on a 
public body in circumstances such as the present’.138 
2.3.3  Commentary on the English approach 
2.3.3.1 Conflating jurisdiction with relief 
The first problem with the English approach is that it does not clearly 
distinguish between two distinct issues, namely whether or not a decision is in 
fact capable of being reviewed – a question of jurisdiction – and whether or 
not the decision should be reviewed – a question of relief. This is perhaps not a 
problem exclusive to England. As Hoexter notes, difficulties with the word 
‘review’ arise due to the fact that it tends to be used both as a verb and as a 
noun.139 ‘Review’ could refer to the process whereby an application is brought 
in which a decision is challenged. It could also refer to a court granting relief 
in the form of reviewing and setting aside the decision complained of.140 
In the cases discussed above it is often not clear in what sense the word 
review is being used. In Hibbit and Saunders141 the court accepted that the 
Lord Chancellor was susceptible to review, implying that the decisions of the 
Lord Chancellor are subject to the review jurisdiction of the courts. However, 
such susceptibility exists only in relation to those decisions which involve an 
adequate public law element. In this sense being ‘susceptible to review’ really 
means a successful application for review, namely obtaining the relief sought. 
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This is evidenced by the court concluding that ‘[t]he decision lacked a 
sufficient public law element to found such relief’.142 What the phrase 
‘susceptible to review’ means therefore becomes unclear as it now 
incorporates an element determinative of review as relief, and not merely 
jurisdiction. In this way the jurisdiction enquiry is to some extent conflated with 
the remedial enquiry. 
Apart from semantic confusion, there are other reasons why it is desirable 
to clearly separate issues of jurisdiction from those of relief. Firstly, the issue of 
relief should logically follow only after the question of jurisdiction has been 
dealt with. In other words, jurisdiction is logically anterior to relief. It may be that 
a court does in fact have jurisdiction to hear a matter, but that review as a 
form of relief would simply not be appropriate in the circumstances. 
2.3.3.2 The requirement of a ‘public law element’ 
The second difficulty with the English approach is that whether or not a 
decision is capable of being reviewed, and whether or not relief should be 
given, is dependent on the presence or absence of a ‘sufficient public law 
element’. The court in Hibbit and Saunders held that in order to determine 
whether or not a public law element is present one must look at the subject 
matter of the decision and determine ‘whether judicial review is 
appropriate’.143 By conflating the susceptibility and outcome enquiries the 
English courts are in fact, although not explicitly, deciding the substantive 
enquiry in the language of the amenability enquiry. This approach is logically 
unsound. It has also resulted in confusion as to whether some procurement 
decisions are ‘immune from judicial review even if they are irrational or 
unfair’,144 and leaves the English law with decidedly less idea of what 
lawfulness and procedural fairness in this area of the law requires. 
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Bailey, in commenting on these and other cases, has argued, not 
surprisingly, that the English approach to the judicial review of government 
procurement is unnecessarily complicated.145 He argues that it ‘requires 
impossible distinctions to be drawn’ and that too much time is spent, and 
wasted, on addressing the amenability enquiry instead of the substantive 
enquiry which should follow.146 He further argues that the test is ‘inherently 
unclear’ and that the authorities which rely on the test ‘cannot…provide 
sufficient guidance’ in new cases that come before the courts.147 Ultimately 
the ‘public law element test’ detracts too much from the more important 
issues, namely ‘the particular public law grounds raised on the facts of the 
case’.148 
Bailey suggests that a better approach would be as follows: First, ‘[i]s the 
decision to award the contract amenable to judicial review?’149 For this 
question to be answered in the affirmative it is sufficient that the decision be 
‘taken in the exercise of a statutory power’,150 in which case the agency 
concerned would be under certain public law obligations. Secondly, ‘the 
content of those obligations’ must be determined, this being ‘heavily context 
specific’.151 Thirdly, have any of these obligations been breached?152 
This approach has much to commend it. It explicitly separates the 
jurisdiction and remedial enquiries. It also recognises that the jurisdiction 
enquiry should not be the difficult or time-consuming question. The primary 
focus of the court should be what public law obligations exist and whether or 
not they have been breached. Framing the entire enquiry as a single enquiry 
focusing on the existence of a public law element is unsatisfactory and 
continues to perpetuate the problems of the courts being ‘highly reluctant 
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to…regard public contracting awards as having a reviewable public law 
element…or…[to] substantively assess alleged defects in the decisions 
contracting authorities reach’.153 
2.4 Evaluating the South African approach to the judicial review of 
government procurement 
The most important difference between the South African and English 
approaches is the extent to which such awards are reviewable. In South Africa 
such awards are essentially completely susceptible to review, whereas in 
England whether or not an award is susceptible to review depends on the 
presence or absence of a sufficient public law element. 
Interestingly, the English approach to the susceptibility of procurement 
decisions to judicial review draws a strong analogy with the South African 
experience of judicial review of administrative action in general. As Hoexter 
notes, the ‘cumbersome and convoluted’ definition of administrative action in 
the PAJA has led to two significant problems.154 The first is that the definition, 
by virtue of its ‘narrowness’,155 has ‘severely circumscribed the realm of 
administrative action’.156 The second is that the resulting threshold requirement 
has led the courts to focus primarily on whether or not an act constitutes 
administrative action to the neglect of the more important enquiry, namely 
what ‘the precise content of lawfulness, reasonableness, and fairness in 
particular cases’ is.157 As a result these notions are underdeveloped in terms of 
the PAJA. For Hoexter this is a serious problem as this subsequent enquiry 
contains ‘the essential questions on which our courts ought to be spending 
their time and energy’.158 Hoexter calls this the ‘distracting effect of the 
concept of administrative action’ – a focus on the question of whether the 
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threshold requirement is met with a ‘tendency for cases to fizzle out’ once this 
question has been answered.159 
A further feature of South African administrative law under the PAJA noted 
by Hoexter is what she calls ‘[a]dministrative action as code’.160 By this she 
means that ‘the results of the administrative action enquiry are disturbingly 
contingent and easily manipulated’.161 Courts tend to decide cases in terms 
of whether or not a decision constitutes administrative action as opposed to 
engaging with ‘the far harder work of articulating their views about the 
substance of the case’.162 Ultimately, ‘the courts are effectively encouraged 
to use code instead of giving explicit recognition to whatever feature is really 
driving them in a particular case’.163 As we have seen above, these problems 
are clearly reflected in the English approach to determining the presence of a 
sufficient public law element. 
Importantly, because the government procurement process constitutes 
administrative action, review proceedings in South African tender disputes are 
able to avoid these problems entirely. Because the decision to award a tender 
constitutes administrative action the courts are free to focus on the substantive 
issues of the particular case. At least in this respect the South African approach 
seems preferable to that of England. 
However, while the problems presented by the English approach may 
provide much to write about, they may not be as significant as those 
associated with South Africa. As already mentioned, the right of unsuccessful 
bidders to take tender awards on review in South Africa has resulted in such 
applications coming before the courts in droves, with consequences for the 
timeous implementation of public programmes. The fact that government 
procurement awards are less amenable to review in England means that these 
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problems can be avoided. One of the principal issues facing the South African 
procurement regime, then, is how to mitigate these undesirable 
consequences. 
Quinot argues that the South African approach is unsatisfactory.164 Whilst 
accepting that ‘constitutional and institutional competence concerns’ do not 
provide ‘forceful arguments to avoid judicial review’ of procurement 
decisions,165 considerations relating to an ‘efficient and effective state 
administration’ do.166 This is because, according to Quinot, the cost and delays 
involved in litigation are necessarily inimical to the principle of cost-
effectiveness – a ‘core principle’ of procurement.167 
A solution proposed by Quinot is to focus on the remedies that may be 
available, with such an approach creating a ‘filter’ to such applications.168 The 
essence of the argument would seem to be that a proper understanding of 
what an appropriate remedy should be in the circumstances can to some 
extent determine the reviewability of the administrative act in question.169 To 
illustrate, Quinot notes that in those cases where an administrator takes a 
decision beyond the scope of their powers170 this should result in the invalidity 
of the decision. This is because ‘here the function of judicial review as a 
constitutional control over the exercise of state power outweighs efficiency 
and certainty concerns’.171 This differs from those decisions where the 
administrator acted within their powers but followed an irregular procedure,172 
in which case ‘review should in principle not be able to result in invalidity’ 
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because ‘in these cases efficiency and certainty generally favour the 
continued factual validity of the commercial conduct’.173 
Quinot does not go so far as to propose a rule barring the application for 
review, even of those decisions where relief in the form of review should, 
according to him, not be forthcoming.174 However, ‘the level of judicial 
intervention should vary depending on the type of challenge’.175 
A number of concerns present themselves with this approach. Firstly, it is 
not entirely clear why distinguishing between the legality and the procedural 
fairness of a decision should determine whether or not review as relief should 
follow. Section 33 of the Constitution requires that administrative action be 
both lawful and procedurally fair. It is not clear that there is a hierarchy among 
these principles which could determine the availability of review as relief. This 
makes it difficult to draw a principled distinction between them which would 
allow invalidity in the event of the breach of one but not the other. 
Perhaps more important is that, in the context of procurement, what 
Quinot refers to as ‘strict legality grounds’176 would seem to incorporate 
procedural fairness. This is because s 217 of the Constitution states that ‘[w]hen 
an organ of state…contracts for goods or services, it must do so in accordance 
with a system which is fair’. As such, in the context of procurement, fairness 
becomes part of the legality enquiry – the authority of the administrator is 
constrained in that they must act fairly when awarding tender contracts. If they 
do not act fairly when doing so, then it seems they have acted beyond the 
scope of their powers, thus rendering any act so performed invalid not only on 
the basis that it was procedurally unfair, but also on the basis of unlawfulness. 
Furthermore, procedural fairness depends on the facts of the case.177 As 
such, it may not be appropriate to adopt an approach whereby in principle 
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procedural fairness should not result in invalidity. Depending on the facts, 
certain cases may cry out for invalidity on the basis of procedural fairness. On 
the contrary, there may be cases where a decision is taken in breach of strict 
legality grounds but where the circumstances are such that a court should 
decline to set the decision aside. This could be due to a number of reasons, for 
example impracticability, public harm, or the absence of any bad faith. 
Secondly, by having circumstances which in principle are not amenable 
to review, a legal system opens itself up to the unsatisfactory state of affairs 
presented by the English approach, where it is possible to apply for review, but 
where effective relief is unlikely to be forthcoming. This is disingenuous. An 
unsuccessful bidder who has incurred the expense of applying for review 
should be entitled to expect the possibility of effective relief in the event their 
application is heard. 
A focus on remedies also leads us to look less at the substantive issues of 
the case, and, as we have seen, this is something that should be avoided. 
Another possible solution would seem to be to flesh out what the substantive 
requirements of such decisions require i.e. what exactly lawfulness and fairness 
require in the context of procurement awards. In this way administrators may 
know better what is required of them. It is clear that the South African 
procurement regime needs to rein in the large number of applications for the 
judicial review of tender awards. However, any attempt to do so must take 
cognisance of the fact that, firstly, the award process constitutes an exercise 
of public power and, secondly, that in South Africa the exercise of all public 
power is subject to judicial scrutiny. Given this framework, it would not seem 
possible to limit the reviewability of these awards. Rather, the solution would 
seem to lie elsewhere. As Speidel notes 
‘the most effective ways to control and improve the quality of 
administrative discretion may be further to clarify and amplify the 
standards for decision at the action level and to establish solid procedures 
for internal administrative review’.178 
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Essentially, the solution best-suited to South Africa’s current problem would 
be improving the quality of decision-making pertaining to procurement 
awards. Given the expense of litigation, it is unlikely that the majority of 
procurement challenges are brought without any prospect of success.179 
Tenderers surely do not expect to win every award for which they bid. 
However, given the financial importance of receiving a tender award, it is 
understandable that bidders will seek relief if they perceive an award to be 
irregular. Arguably, increasing the incidence of lawful procurement decisions 
should decrease the number of applications for review. 
2.5   Conclusion 
The development in South Africa that government procurement awards 
are subject to judicial review at the instance of an unsuccessful bidder is a 
significant one. It is a break from both the pre-1994 position and the historical 
trend in some common law jurisdictions in terms of which such decisions were 
regarded as largely immune from review. It also accords squarely with South 
Africa’s approach of subjecting the exercise of all public power to 
constitutional control. 
As government procurement in South Africa constitutes administrative 
action, the review process is able to avoid those problems associated with 
both the judicial review of non-administrative action and the approach 
adopted in England. Unfortunately, the South African approach has resulted 
in the courts being plagued by applications for the review of government 
tender awards. One solution to this problem would be to simply limit the 
reviewability of these decisions in some way. However, this would present 
problems of its own. Arguably, the solution to the problem lies not in limiting the 
scope of judicial review, but in better decision-making on the part of those 
officials tasked with making the awards.180 
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Because these decisions are reviewable, courts may not shy away from 
the task of deciding whether or not to set aside an unlawful award, despite the 
difficulties associated with this decision. Of course, the courts need only make 
this decision once they find that the award is in fact unlawful. It is therefore 
important to understand, firstly, the legal framework of government 
procurement to which government agencies are bound when awarding 
government tenders and, secondly, how the courts determine whether or not 
such an award is unlawful. 
                                                          





THE NATURE AND DETERMINATION OF UNLAWFULNESS IN 
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT AWARDS 
3.1 Introduction 
According to Hoexter, lawfulness in the context of administrative action 
means, quite simply, ‘that administrative actions and decisions must be duly 
authorised by law and that any statutory requirements or preconditions that 
attach to the exercise of the power must be complied with’.1 
However, the determination of lawfulness in government procurement 
presents a story of some confusion and disagreement in the courts. In some 
instances the courts have required strict compliance with the procurement 
framework.2 In others they have been willing to overlook flaws.3 What exactly 
compliance requires has therefore been a contentious issue. In the seminal 
case of AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief 
Executive Officer, South African Social Security Agency and Others4 the 
Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) held that, despite the peremptory nature of 
procurement law, irregularities in the tender process must be consequential in 
order to be reviewable.5 This approach was discarded by the Constitutional 
Court (CC) on appeal.6 The CC dismissed the idea of an ‘inconsequential 
irregularity’ as being relevant to the determination of lawfulness. Instead the 
court held that whether or not an irregularity is material depends on whether 
the purpose of the provision is given effect to.7 
                                                          
1 Cora Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 2 ed (2012) at 253. 
2 See Sanyathi Civil Engineering and Construction (Pty) Ltd v eThekwini Municipality, Group 5 
Construction (Pty) Ltd v eThekwini Municipality (KZPHC) unreported case no 7538/11 (24 
October 2011) para 21; Rainbow Civils CC v Minister of Transport and Public Works, Western 
Cape and Another (WCHC) unreported case no 21158/12 (6 February 2013) para 72 and 111. 
3 See Moseme Road Construction CC and Others v King Civil Engineering Contractors (Pty) Ltd 
and Another 2010 (4) SA 359 (SCA) para 21. 
4 2013 (4) SA 557 (SCA). 
5 Ibid para 96. 
6 AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief Executive Officer of the 
South African Social Security Agency and Others 2014 (1) SA 604 (CC). 
7 Ibid para 22. 
37 
 
The legal framework of government procurement is complex. As the courts 
have recognised, administrators calling for and awarding tenders are ‘bound 
by the Constitution, the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 
(“PAJA”), the Preferential Procurement Process, its own tender policy and the 
common law’.8 Frequently, s 217 of the Constitution9 plays a central role in the 
determination of unlawfulness, despite there being a number of statutes and 
regulations which themselves regulate government procurement.10 
A comprehensive treatment of the law of government procurement in 
South Africa is not required to understand lawfulness in this area of the law.11 
However, an overview of the legal framework of this subject is certainly 
helpful.12 
3.2   The legal framework of government procurement in South Africa 
3.2.1  The Constitution 
The foundational provision for government procurement in South Africa is 
s 217 of the Constitution, which provides as follows: 
‘(1) When an organ of state in the national, provincial, or local sphere of 
government, or any other institution identified in national legislation, 
contracts for goods or services, it must do so in accordance with a system 
which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive, and cost-effective. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not prevent the organs of state or institutions 
referred to in that subsection from implementing a procurement policy 
providing for – 
(a) categories of preference in the allocation of contracts; and 
(b) the protection or advancement of persons, or categories of persons, 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. 
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(3) National legislation must prescribe a framework within which the policy 
referred to in subsection (2) must be implemented.’ 
Section 217 is significant for a number of reasons. Whilst it is doubtful that it 
is the source of the state’s contractual capacity,13 it is certainly ‘the source of 
[governmental] procurement regulation’.14 Section 217 has been described 
judicially as ‘the foundation for all public procurement’,15 ‘the starting point’ of 
any enquiry into such activity,16 and the provision according to which such 
activity is ‘governed’.17 In any application for the review of government 
procurement awards, the courts invariably start with a recognition that s 217 
governs the enquiry. 
Furthermore, s 195 of the Constitution sets out the values and principles 
which govern the public administration. This section states that the public 
administration ‘must’ be governed by, among others, the following principles: 
‘[a] high standard of professional ethics’,18 ‘[e]fficient, economic, and 
effective use of resources’,19 the impartial, fair, and equitable provision of 
services,20 and accountability.21 Although the principles in s 195 ‘appear to 
impose duties without giving rise to justiciable rights’,22 there is little doubt that 
government procurement ‘is also subject to the principles in s 195(1) of the 
Constitution’.23 
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A number of statutes together comprise the legislative scheme for 
government procurement in South Africa. Among these are the Public Finance 
Management Act (the PFMA),24 which applies to procurement at the national 
and provincial levels, the Local Government: Municipal Finance Management 
Act (the MFMA),25 which applies to procurement at the municipal level, and 
the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act (the PPPFA),26 which 
applies to all procurement undertaken in terms of s 217(2) and (3) of the 
Constitution. Taken together, these pieces of legislation, along with their 
regulations, can be said to constitute ‘the core of public procurement law’.27 
In addition, the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act28 is also applicable. 
As the decision to award a tender also constitutes administrative action29 
it must be done in accordance with both s 33 of the Constitution and the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (the PAJA).30 Administrators awarding 
tender contracts are therefore required to comply not only with the applicable 
constitutional provisions and legislation. They are also required to ensure that 
the process of awarding the tender adheres to the requirements of 
administrative justice.31 
3.2.3 A fragmented, burdensome and problematic procurement regime 
The disjointed legal framework regulating government procurement 
outlined above is far from satisfactory. As Quinot notes, the various sources of 
regulation ‘provide a normative framework for the development of a coherent 
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system of public procurement regulation’.32 Ultimately, however, ‘the 
regulatory regime remains highly fragmented and all but coherently 
organised’33 and instead resembles a ‘hodge podge of rules from all the major 
branches of the law’.34 
Such a legal framework increases the burden on administrators awarding 
tenders in ensuring the lawfulness of the decision taken. As such, it is 
conceivable that there will often be discrepancies between the legislative 
requirements and the process followed. As the SCA noted in AllPay, ‘[t]here will 
be few cases of any moment in which flaws in the process of public 
procurement cannot be found, particularly where it is scrutinised intensely with 
the object of doing so’.35 
The complexity of the procurement framework necessarily contributes to 
the plethora of cases in which procurement awards are taken on review.36 As 
the SCA recently remarked: 
‘The necessity to comply with the obligations imposed by s 217...has 
resulted in the enactment of numerous interrelated statutes, regulations 
and directives. This, in turn, has given rise to a convoluted set of rules and 
requirements that have proved to be fertile ground for litigation with the 
law reports becoming littered with cases dealing with public tenders’.37 
This is far from ideal. The legal framework of government procurement 
should result in an efficient and effective procurement regime in order for those 
programmes forming the subject matter of the awards to be implemented 
timeously. 
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3.3 The peremptory nature of government procurement law 
The legal framework regulating government procurement is peremptory, 
meaning that the various legal rules and regulations must be complied with.38 
This is evidenced by both the prevalence of the word ‘must’ in s 217 and much 
of the primary legislation, as well as numerous judicial pronouncements 
confirming this. It is also a principle of statutory interpretation that ‘language of 
a predominantly imperative nature such as “must” is to be construed as 
peremptory rather than directory unless there are other circumstances which 
negate this construction’.39 Administrators awarding government tenders may 
therefore not deviate from the prescribed framework. Indeed, ‘the 
Constitution and the legislation pertaining to procurement are emphatically 
prescriptive’.40 
It is not difficult to see why this is so. Government procurement has been 
described judicially as ‘notoriously subject to influence and manipulation’.41 
Unfortunately, the South African experience has seen government 
procurement be plagued by corruption.42 Indeed, ‘the high standards that the 
Constitution sets seem to be more honoured in the breach than in the 
observance’.43 This is problematic because government procurement is 
funded by public money and must be done in the public interest.44 It is also in 
the public interest that competent contractors able to render performance in 
terms of public contracts are not deterred from submitting bids. 
A peremptory procurement regime aims to minimise corruption, ensure 
fairness for those bidding, and ensure the continued integrity of the 
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procurement regime.45 Indeed, the ‘high standard of governance of public 
administration…is prescribed in order to prevent corruption’.46 
A peremptory regime also accords with the separation of powers in that 
courts are able to scrutinise and set aside decisions on the basis of non-
compliance with prescribed legal rules as opposed to whether or not an 
administrator exercised their discretion appropriately. If the procurement 
regime were to afford administrators a wide discretion in awarding tenders the 
courts would find themselves in the uncomfortable position of second-guessing 
administrative decisions. This would then ‘draw the courts into the merits of 
administrative decisions, thereby breaking down the ground between appeal 
and review’.47 
3.4 The basis of unlawfulness in government procurement 
3.4.1 Non-compliance with s 217 
To a large extent the lawfulness or otherwise of a procurement award is 
determined with reference to s 217. For example, in Telkom SA Ltd v Merid 
Trading (Pty) Ltd and Others; Bihati Solutions (Pty) Ltd v Telkom SA Ltd and 
Others48 the court stated that ‘[t]he Constitution lays down minimum 
requirements for a valid tender process’49 and that ‘[t]he question to be 
decided is whether the procedure followed...was in compliance with s 217’.50 
In fact, s 217 often plays a central role to the determination of lawfulness 
even where other legislative provisions are concerned. For example, in 
government procurement only those tenders deemed acceptable in terms of 
the PPPFA are ‘eligible for consideration’.51 Acceptability is therefore a 
‘threshold requirement’.52 The acceptance of a tender which is not 
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acceptable is ‘an invalid act and falls to be set aside’.53 As such, tenders that 
do not constitute acceptable tenders should in principle be disqualified. 
An acceptable tender is defined in the PPPFA as ‘any tender which, in all 
respects, complies with the specifications and conditions of tender as set out 
in the tender document’.54 According to this definition the acceptability of a 
tender is determined solely by reference to the contents of the tender 
document. 
However, despite the definition of an acceptable tender the SCA has held 
that the tender document is not the primary determinant of acceptability. In 
Chairperson, Standing Tender Committee and Others v JFE Sapela Electronics 
(Pty) Ltd and Others55 the issue involved the acceptance of an unacceptable 
tender. The tender in question was for the repair and maintenance of prisons 
in the Western Cape.56 The third respondent had submitted a bid for 
substantially less than the first respondent.57 As a result the third respondent was 
awarded the tender. Given that cost-effectiveness is ‘normally the primary 
concern for organs of state when they contract for goods and services’58 it 
would seem that the Department had good reason to award the third 
respondent the tender. However, upon closer inspection it became clear that 
the third respondent had quoted the low price that it did with a view that some 
work would not have to be done.59 The first respondent argued that, by pricing 
as it did, the third respondent ‘gained an unfair advantage over other 
tenderers’ and that its bid was not an acceptable tender and should have 
been disqualified.60 
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The court noted that whether or not a tender was acceptable was to be 
determined not merely on the basis of compliance with the tender document. 
Rather, 
‘[t]he definition of “acceptable tender” in the Preferential Act must be 
construed against the background of the system envisaged by s 217(1) of 
the Constitution, namely one which is “fair, equitable, transparent, 
competitive and effective”. In other words, whether “the tender in all 
respects complies with the specifications and conditions of tender as set 
out in the tender documents” must be judged against these values’.61 
By pricing as it did, ‘in effect omit[ting] from [its] tender a whole section of 
the work’, the third respondent gained an ‘unfair advantage over competing 
tenderers’.62 The court held that such a tender was inimical to the values 
contained in s 217 and therefore was not an acceptable tender as required 
by the PPPFA.63 Accordingly, the award of the tender to the third respondent 
on the strength of an unacceptable tender was unlawful and invalid.64 
It is notable that the court resorts to s 217 in determining the lawfulness of 
the administrator’s actions in accepting the tender. Section 1 of the PPPFA is 
clear; an acceptable bid is one which complies with the tender document. 
However, determining acceptability solely by reference to the tender 
document could be problematic if bids which otherwise complied therewith 
also somehow undermined s 217. This is avoided by judging the acceptability, 
and therefore lawfulness, of a bid against the requirements of s 217. Section 
217 therefore provides a safeguard to the acceptance of bids which the 
definition of an acceptable tender in s 1 of the PPPFA lacks. 
3.4.2 Non-compliance with legislation 
Lawfulness is not always determined by reference to s 217. There is an array 
of statutory and regulatory provisions with which any given tender award must 
                                                          






comply. Often lawfulness is determined on the basis of compliance with these 
provisions without reference to s 217. 
The Constitution specifically contemplates making provision for giving 
preference to historically disadvantaged individuals when awarding tenders.65 
This is given effect to by the PPPFA. Section 2 of this Act states as follows: 
‘(1) An organ of state must determine its preferential procurement policy 
and implement it within the following framework: 
(a) A preference point system must be followed: 
(b) (i) for contracts with a Rand value above a prescribed amount a 
maximum of 10 points may be allocated for specific goals as 
contemplated in paragraph (d) provided that the lowest acceptable 
tender scores 90 points for price; 
(ii) for contracts with a Rand value equal to or below a prescribed amount 
a maximum of 20 points may be allocated for specific goals as 
contemplated in paragraph (d) provided that the lowest acceptable 
tender scores 80 points for price; 
(c) Any other acceptable tenders which are higher in price must score 
fewer points, on a pro rata basis, calculated on their tender prices in 
relation to the lowest acceptable tender, in accordance with a 
prescribed formula; 
(d) The specific goals may include –  
(i) Contracting with persons, or categories of persons, historically 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination on the basis of race, gender or 
disability; 
(ii) Implementing the programmes of the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme as published in Government Gazette No. 
16085 dated 23 November 1994; 
(e) Any specific goal for which a point may be awarded, must be clearly 
specified in the invitation to submit a tender; 
(f) The contract must be awarded to the tenderer who scores the highest 
points, unless objective criteria in addition to those contemplated in 
paragraph (d) and (e) justify the award to another tenderer.’ 
A number of features stand out from s 2. Firstly, a maximum number of 
points, depending on the size of the contract, may be awarded for those goals 
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referred to in subsection (d). Secondly, a tender must be awarded to the 
tenderer who scores the highest number of points. Thirdly, a tender may be 
awarded to a tenderer who does not score the most points provided 
‘objective criteria in addition to those contemplated in paragraph (d) and (e) 
justify’ doing so. The question which then arises is whether or not the gender 
and racial preferences of a bidder who does not score the most points may 
constitute such objective criteria justifying the award of the tender to that 
bidder in terms of subsection (1)(f). 
Grinaker LTA Ltd and Another v Tender Board (Mpumalanga) and Others66 
concerned the decision to award a contract for the construction of a section 
of road in Mpumalanga.67 The tender document in question had stipulated 
that the PPPFA and its regulations would apply and that ‘[a] maximum of 20 
points shall be allocated for the participation of HDIs (Historically 
disadvantaged Individuals) as equity owners in the contracting firm or joint 
venture’.68 
The relevant consultant employed to assess the bids had recommended 
Grinaker’s bid on the basis that it scored the most points and was for the lowest 
price and, furthermore, ‘that no objective criteria exist[ed] to justify the award 
of the contract to another tenderer’.69 The tender committee accordingly 
recommended that Grinaker be awarded the contract on the basis that it was 
experienced, had resources, and would ‘enhance the Government’s policy of 
empowerment and SMME participation in the Provincial economy’.70 Despite 
these recommendations the Tender Board resolved to award the tender to 
another bidder.71 The Board gave a number of inconsistent and contradictory 
reasons as to why it took the decision to the award the tender to whom it did.72 
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Ultimately, the court found the decision of the Tender Board reviewable 
on a number of grounds.73 The Tender Board had been of the opinion that the 
original points awarded to their preferred bidder for equity considerations were 
too low, and accordingly revised those points upwards by a substantial 
margin.74 In doing so, however, the Tender Board did not act in accordance 
with the applicable regulations but on the basis of the importance it attributed 
to ‘the extent of participation in the implementation of the contract, the skills 
transfer, the relative involvement of other HDI subcontractors, [and] the 
number of HDI individuals involved’ with its preferred bidder.75 Essentially, the 
Tender Board attributed more importance to the historical disadvantage and 
equity considerations of its preferred bidder than that allowed by the PPPFA 
and its regulations. 
The court, in its exposition of s 2(1) of the PPPFA, held that the Tender Board 
was in fact 
‘obliged to award the tender to the tenderer who had scored the highest 
points namely [Grinaker], “unless objective criteria in addition to those 
contemplated in paragraphs (d) and (e) justify the award to another 
tenderer”, as provided in section 2(1)(f) of the Procurement Act’.76 
The court held that the words ‘in addition to’ mean ‘over and above’77 i.e. 
considerations other than those for which provision had already been made. 
In this regard the court held that 
‘[p]aragraph (f) [of s 2(1) of the PPPFA]...contemplates objective criteria 
over and above those contemplated in paragraphs (d) and (e). The 
criteria contemplated in paragraphs (d) and (e) would, if the specific goal 
is clearly specified in the invitation to submit a tender, be the basis for the 
award of a maximum of ten points. To my mind, the legislature therefore 
envisaged that over and above the objective criteria contemplated in 
paragraphs (d) and (e), there might be were [sic] objective criteria 
justifying the award to another tenderer than the tenderer who had 
scored the highest points. To put it differently, the legislature did not intend 
that criteria contemplated in paragraphs (d) and (e), should be taken into 
account twice, firstly in determining what score was achieved out of ten 
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in respect of the criteria contemplated in these paragraphs and, 
secondly, in taking into account those selfsame criteria to determine 
whether objective criteria justified the award of the contract to another 
tenderer than the one who had scored the highest points’.78 
The Tender Board had been of the opinion that it was entitled to consider 
empowerment as an objective reason justifying the awarding of the tender to 
the successful bidder, even if this meant awarding the tender to a bidder who 
did not tender the lowest price. In this regard the Tender Board thought itself 
entitled to ‘pay a premium for empowerment’ as long as the tender was within 
budget.79 The court, however, disagreed.80 It held that the legislature had 
made provision for empowerment as a consideration to be taken into account 
‘in the point system’.81 As the Tender Board was of the opinion that it was 
entitled to take into account the successful bidder’s empowerment 
credentials a second time, it had ‘failed to apply its mind’ and ‘did not 
understand the behests of the statutes that it had to apply’.82 Accordingly, its 
decision to award the tender to the successful bidder was unlawful. 
Similarly, in Rainbow Civils CC v Minister of Transport and Public Works, 
Western Cape and Others83 one of the grounds of review was that the 
administrator was of the view that awarding the tender to the winning tenderer 
would result in ‘increas[ed] access of black women to economic activities’.84 
The court referred approvingly to the dictum in Grinaker and held that, as 
the winning tenderer had already been awarded preference points based on 
affirmative action and BEE considerations, the administrator was not entitled 
to take such considerations into account a second time.85 In this respect the 
court held that the administrator had 
‘failed to appreciate that his power was confined to the four corners of 
the Procurement Act, the Procurement Regulations and the Tender 
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Document, and that he had no general discretion to take into account 
considerations of race and gender or affirmative action outside of the 
specific parameters laid down therein’.86 
The court considered it significant that the B-BBEE Act and codes of good 
practice had already been taken into account in formulating the tender in 
question,87 as the organ of state in question was ‘obliged’ to do.88 In the result, 
any gender and racial preferences were ‘already built in to the very matrix of 
the tender’.89 As such, the decision to award the tender was ‘materially 
influenced by an error of law, as contemplated in section 6(2)(d) of PAJA’.90 
3.4.3 Lawfulness unrefined 
The preceding discussions show that in some cases the courts determine 
the lawfulness or otherwise of an award with reference to s 217, whereas in 
others they do not. Government procurement is comprehensively regulated 
by statute, regulations, and directives, all far more detailed than the five 
principles contained in s 217. Why, then, is s 217 determinative of unlawfulness 
in some cases but not in others? 
3.4.3.1 The incorporation of s 217 into the legislation 
Section 217(1) says that the contracting of goods and services must be 
done in accordance with a ‘system which is fair, equitable, transparent, 
competitive and cost-effective’. In Steenkamp NO v The Provincial Tender 
Board, Eastern Cape91 the CC recognised that s 217 
‘lays down that an organ of State in any of the three spheres of 
government, if authorised by law may contract for goods and services on 
behalf of government. However, the tendering system it devises must be 
fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective’.92 
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Despite s 217 referring to a ‘system’, the courts have interpreted s 217 as 
demanding that the procurement process must be ‘fair, equitable, 
transparent, competitive and cost-effective’.93 The reason for this lies in the 
wording of much of the legislative framework itself, which often simply repeats 
the requirement that procurement be fair, equitable, transparent, competitive 
and cost-effective, without really prescribing how this is meant to be achieved. 
For example, the regulations promulgated in terms of the PFMA prescribe that 
‘[t]he accounting officer or accounting authority...must develop and 
implement…an effective and efficient supply chain management system 
for…the acquisition of goods and services.’94 In addition, the supply chain 
management system ‘must be…fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and 
cost-effective’.95 
The Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act states that 
‘[t]he supply chain management policy of a municipality or municipal entity 
must be fair, equitable, transparent, competitive, and cost-effective’.96 Again, 
these are the same principles listed in s 217. In terms of regulations promulgated 
under the Act, ‘[e]ach municipality and each municipal entity 
must…implement a supply chain management policy that…gives effect to…s 
217 of the Constitution…and is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive, and 
cost-effective’.97 
Little, then, is actually provided by way of normative guidance on how the 
substantive principles of s 217 are meant to be achieved. It is then not surprising 
that the courts refer to s 217 for this purpose. As the CC recently stated: 
‘[t]he legislative framework for procurement policy under section 
217...thus provides the context within which judicial review of state 
procurement decisions under PAJA review grounds must be assessed. The 
requirements of a constitutionally fair, equitable, transparent, competitive 
and cost-effective procurement system will thus inform, enrich and give 
particular content to the applicable grounds of review under PAJA in a 
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given case. The facts of each case will determine what any shortfall in the 
requirements of the procurement system – unfairness, inequity, lack of 
transparency, lack of competitiveness or cost-inefficiency – may lead to: 
procedural unfairness, irrationality, unreasonableness or any other review 
ground under PAJA’.98 
In this sense, unlawfulness in the context of government procurement 
awards is really unconstitutionality,99 the irregularity in question being an 
infringement of one or more of the requirements contained in s 217. 
3.4.3.2 Varying degrees of comprehensiveness in the procurement 
framework 
We saw earlier that in those cases involving s 2(1)(f) of the PPPFA the courts 
frequently refer to the intention of the legislature.100 However, they do not do 
this with the definition of an acceptable tender contained in s 1. One possible 
reason for the difference in approach would be that s 2(1)(f) is far more 
detailed and comprehensive than the definition of an acceptable tender 
contained in s 1. Furthermore, s 2(1)(f) deals with policy considerations that the 
legislature clearly spent more time applying its mind to than the definition of 
an acceptable tender. 
A plain reading of s 2(1)(f) also does not present the same concern that 
the definition of an acceptable tender does. The definition of an acceptable 
tender suggests that acceptability is determined solely with reference to the 
relevant tender document. As such, it is more reasonable to defer to the 
intention of the legislature as an interpretative device with regard to s 2(1)(f) 
than to s 1. This is amplified by the fact that it is unlikely that the legislature could 
have intended for lawfulness to be determined solely on the basis of a tender 
document which it will have no hand in drafting. By imposing the requirements 
of s 217 onto the definition of an acceptable tender, the courts ensure that 
lawfulness is determined in accordance with those objective standards which 
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remain the same for all tenders submitted, as opposed to tender documents 
which may be different from one another. 
Section 2(1)(f) also provides comprehensive regulation to that which it 
aims to regulate. The same cannot be said for the definition of acceptable 
tender in s 1. Arguably, this is the primary reason why s 217 is resorted to with 
the latter but not the former. 
3.5 The requirement of materiality in unlawful irregularities 
We are now in a position to consider what kind of deviations from the 
procurement framework result in unlawfulness. As the SCA noted in AllPay, for 
an irregularity or defect to result in unlawfulness it must somehow be ‘in conflict 
with the law’.101 The question we are then concerned with is what makes an 
irregularity in conflict with the law. 
3.5.1 Separating the lawfulness and remedial enquiries 
Before addressing this issue it is useful to first consider a related issue which 
has until recently confused the determination of unlawfulness in tender 
disputes. This has been the tendency of the courts in some cases to determine 
the unlawfulness of the award with reference to whether or not the award 
should be set aside. In Moseme Road Construction CC and Others v King Civil 
Engineering Contractors (Pty) Ltd and Another,102 the successful tenderer, King, 
initially did not qualify to tender as it was not classified as a contractor 
‘considered capable of performing contracts having a value in excess of 
R100m’.103 This requirement was later seemingly withdrawn. King thereafter 
submitted another bid, scored the highest number of points, and was 
recommended for the contract.104 However, King’s tender was subsequently 
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disqualified on the basis of unfair competition and the contract was awarded 
to Moseme.105 
The High Court set aside the decision to award the tender to Moseme on 
the basis ‘that the decision was taken arbitrarily, that the matter had not been 
considered properly, and that the department had taken irrelevant 
considerations into account’.106 Importantly, the High Court then awarded the 
contract to King.107 
The SCA disagreed with the ease with which the High Court set aside the 
award and awarded the contract to King. The court held that ‘[a] declaration 
of invalidity of the tender award in this case can also not be considered in 
isolation. One has to consider the possible consequences’.108 The SCA 
concluded that the High Court failed to ‘consider the degree of the 
irregularity’ and held ‘that King, in spite of the imperfect administrative process, 
[was] not entitled to any relief. Not every slip in the administration of tenders is 
necessarily to be visited by judicial sanction’.109 
The import of the SCA’s statements is problematic. This is because s 
172(1)(a) of the Constitution says that a court must declare invalid any 
conduct inconsistent with the Constitution. The potential consequences of 
such a declaration, if any, should not feature in the court’s determination. They 
are only taken into account when determining a just and equitable order in 
terms of s 172(1)(b). 
In the seminal case of AllPay the SCA in its judgment again conflated the 
issues of lawfulness and remedy. This case concerned a challenge by AllPay to 
the award of a tender to Cash Paymaster Services for the payments of social 
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grants to some 15 million people in all nine provinces of the Republic110 with an 
estimated value of R10 billion.111 
The High Court had found that the award to CPS was unlawful and 
invalid.112 In the court’s view the reduction in AllPay’s score was irrational,113 
there was a failure to assess the BEE partners of CPS who were to perform the 
majority of the contract,114 and CPS had failed to comply with the mandatory 
requirement of submitting separate bids for each province.115 However, 
despite this finding, the High Court did not set aside the decision to award the 
tender to the successful bidder.116 
In its judgment the SCA recognised that irregularities frequently present 
themselves in the context of tender awards.117 However, in its view ‘a fair 
process does not demand perfection and not every flaw is fatal’.118 
Furthermore, the SCA pointed out that ‘[i]t would be gravely prejudicial to the 
public interest if the law was to invalidate public contracts for inconsequential 
irregularities’.119 In the SCA’s view, then, the potential effects of declaring an 
award invalid is at least a factor to be considered in determining the lawfulness 
or otherwise of an award. 
However, prejudice to the public interest could only arise if an award is set 
aside. This is a question of remedy, to be considered only once an unlawful 
irregularity in the award process is found. As in Moseme, the fact that the court 
does regard the setting aside of the award as relevant to the lawfulness 
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enquiry shows that it at least to some extent conflates the lawfulness enquiry 
with the remedial enquiry. 
This issue was finally resolved on a further appeal in AllPay, where the CC 
rejected the idea that ‘the public interest in procurement matters requires 
greater caution in finding that grounds for judicial review exist’.120 The court 
also rejected the idea that ‘even if proven irregularities exist, the inevitability of 
a certain outcome is a factor that should be considered in determining the 
validity of administrative action’.121 In the CC’s view such an approach 
‘undermines the role procedural requirements play in ensuring even treatment 
of all bidders’,122 and that ‘it overlooks that the purpose of a fair process is to 
ensure the best outcome’.123 
The court therefore unequivocally separates the lawfulness enquiry from 
that of a just and equitable remedy. It is now clear that whether or not an 
administrative decision in the context of procurement awards is lawful or not 
does not require a consideration of what the potential consequences of such 
a finding would be. Any such consequences are only brought into account 
and given due consideration when, in the event of a finding of unlawfulness, 
the court must determine a just and equitable remedy. The court calls this a 
‘clear distinction, between the constitutional invalidity of administrative action 
and the just and equitable remedy that may follow from it’.124 
3.5.2 The notion of fundamental irregularities 
In Sanyathi the court considered whether the irregularity in question – the 
granting of an award on the strength of an unlawful tender notice – was 
‘formal, superficial and easily remedied’ or a ‘fundamental illegality’.125 The 
court held that such an irregularity was in fact ‘fundamental’126 and 
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‘foundational’,127 reasoning that ‘the deviation from s 2(1)(b) of the PPPFA 
contaminates the core of the tender’.128 As a result, the subsequent award of 
the tender based on this irregularity was unlawful and invalid129 as it was 
contrary to the requirements of s 217.130 
Similarly, in Rainbow Civils the court held that a tender awarded on the 
strength of a tender document containing inconsistencies and contradictions 
was irregular and unlawful.131 The court noted that such irregularities were 
‘material as they relate to a fundamental part of the tender process’.132 The 
court noted that ‘the imperatives of fairness and transparency, laid down in 
section 217(1) of the Constitution, dictate that prospective tenderers should be 
properly informed of the tender evaluation criteria to be applied’.133 
At least in these two cases the idea that an irregularity is in some sense 
fundamental features prominently in the courts’ finding of unlawfulness. This by 
itself is unsatisfactory, as it leaves us in no better position in distinguishing 
between fundamental and non-fundamental irregularities. What the courts 
seem to imply, however, is that the unlawfulness of the irregularity depends on 
whether or not it offends the requirements of s 217. In this sense a fundamental 
irregularity is simply one which has the effect of undermining s 217. Section 217 
thus provides the benchmark against which we may measure whether or not 
an irregularity is unlawful. Such an approach is beneficial given the many 
different ways in which an irregularity may be present. 
3.5.3 Linking lawful compliance with the purpose of the provision 
The CC’s judgment in AllPay presents the most comprehensive and recent 
authority on the legal principles applicable to the determination of 
unlawfulness in government procurement. In it the court lays down the 
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procedure to be followed in determining whether or not an irregularity is 
material. This is done by determining ‘factually, whether an irregularity 
occurred’134 and, secondly, whether such irregularity ‘amounts to a ground of 
review under PAJA’.135 This second enquiry is a ‘legal evaluation [which] must, 
where appropriate, take into account the materiality of any deviance from 
legal requirements, by linking the question of compliance to the purpose of 
the provision’.136 The court also reaffirms the centrality of s 217 and the 
legislation making up the procurement framework to the determination of 
whether or not a ground of review has been established under the PAJA.137 
The two areas in which the CC disagreed with the SCA was on the issue of 
black economic empowerment and the effect of Bidders Notice 2. The 
Request For Proposals had provided that bidders could claim ‘preference 
points’ based on black equity ownership and that ‘tenders would be 
evaluated using a system which awards points on the basis of the tendered 
price and equity ownership’.138 Tenderers were thus able to score higher and 
achieve a greater likelihood of success depending on their BEE status. AllPay 
had argued that as SASSA had not satisfied itself to the BEE credentials of CPS’s 
partners (who were to perform a substantial portion of the contract) the 
decision to award the decision to CPS was unlawful. 
The SCA had held that the failure on the part of SASSA to assess the BEE 
partners of CPS did not constitute a reviewable irregularity as ‘SASSA was not 
required by law to assess the companies’,139 there was no unfairness to 
AllPay,140 and as SASSA could guard against any risk by imposing contractual 
conditions on CPS its decision was not irrational or unreasonable.141 
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AllPay also contended that Bidders Notice 2 was irregular because it had 
the effect of making biometric verification compulsory, whereas the Request 
for Proposals had merely regarded this as a preference.142 The SCA rejected 
the notion that Bidders Notice 2 had the effect of changing ‘what had been 
asked for in the RFP’.143 Instead, 
‘Bidders Notice 2 made a difference to bidders only if they did not have 
the mandatory solution and were bidding against others who also did not 
have the solution. Before Bidders Notice 2 their bids would have been 
considered. After Bidders Notice 2 their bids would be rejected. But it 
made no difference to such a bidder who was in competition with a 
bidder who did have the mandatory solution. In that competition bidders 
were told by clause 3.3.1 that the mandatory solution would be chosen 
above other solutions. Bidders Notice 2 placed the bidder in no worse 
position. His or her solution would not have been chosen in any event. The 
notice informed the bidder only that he or she need not bid at all’.144 
The SCA places great store on the effect of Bidders Notice 2 in determining 
whether or not it resulted in unfairness. The court’s argument is essentially thus: 
as the RFP already listed biometric verification as a preference, it was bound 
to accept any tender that offered such a solution over any other tender that 
did not. And as Bidders Notice 2 now made biometric verification a 
requirement, it would make no difference in the circumstances to the position 
of AllPay vis-a-vis CPS. This is because if the tender was awarded according to 
the requirements of the RFP CPS would be preferred over AllPay because it 
offered a preferred solution which AllPay did not. If the tender was awarded 
according to Bidders Notice 2 (which it was) CPS would be, and was, preferred 
over AllPay as it offered a required solution which AllPay did not. In short, AllPay 
would have lost under both sets of requirements and, as such, Bidders Notice 
2 could not result in unfairness to AllPay. 
The CC disagreed with the SCA on both counts. It held that black 
economic empowerment in the context of procurement requires 
‘[s]ubstantive empowerment, not mere formal compliance’.145 Accordingly, 
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this placed ‘an obligation on SASSA to ensure that the empowerment 
credentials of the prospective tenderers were investigated and confirmed 
before the award was finally made’.146 
As SASSA failed to satisfy itself as to the BEE credentials of CPS and its 
partners ‘the true goal of empowerment requirements was never given effect 
to’.147 In other words, the purpose of the relevant empowerment requirements 
was to ensure the attainment of substantive empowerment. As the 
empowerment credentials of CPS were not investigated the purpose of the 
provision could not be achieved, thus making the irregularity material.148 
On the issue of biometric verification the CC found that Bidders Notice 2 
caused confusion not only among bidders, but even among members of the 
BEC and BAC.149 It resulted in AllPay’s score being lowered below 70% and thus 
effectively disqualifying AllPay from the process. As such, ‘no comparison of 
the competitiveness of AllPay’s and Cash Paymaster’s bids was made 
regarding price’.150 There was thus ‘vagueness and uncertainty about the 
nature and importance of the verification requirements in relation to 
payments’ which were ‘highly material’.151 The court held that this created 
confusion on both the issue of whether or not the evaluation of the bids was to 
be done on the basis of biometric verification being mandatory or preferable 
and at what stage such biometric verification had to be done.152 Accordingly, 
the tender was reviewable under s 6(2)(i) of the PAJA.153 Furthermore, the court 
acknowledged that this has the effect of rendering the tender process 
unfair.154 This is because 
‘[t]he purpose of a tender is not to reward bidders who are clever enough 
to decipher unclear directions. It is to elicit the best solution through a 
process that is fair, equitable, transparent, cost-effective and competitive. 
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Because of the uncertainty caused by the wording of the Request for 
Proposals and Bidders Notice 2, that purpose was not achieved in this 
case’.155 
The case of AllPay represents most clearly the dilemma that is faced when 
courts are asked to pronounce on the validity of large-scale tender awards, 
the setting aside of which has the potential to cause massive disruption to 
public programmes and which could be detrimental to the public interest. That 
the SCA and the CC took such divergent views on the lawfulness of the award 
is also significant. The SCA had held that irregularities that were inconsequential 
were not material. The CC held that lawfulness is to be determined not on the 
basis of whether or not such irregularity affects the outcome of a decision, but 
on the basis of whether or not the purpose of a requirement is given effect to. 
The CC also links the purpose of a tender with the requirements of s 217. 
Ultimately, it seems that lawfulness in tender disputes is to be determined by 
whether or not the purpose of a provision, gleaned from 217, is given effect to. 
In the CC’s own words ‘[t]he materiality of compliance with legal requirements 
depends on the extent to which the purpose of the requirements is 
attained’.156 Interestingly, this test is substantially the same as that adopted by 
the SCA in Millennium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson, Tender 
Board: Limpopo Province and Others157 where the court said as follows: ‘[i]n 
determining whether this non-compliance rendered the appellant’s tender 
unacceptable, regard must also be had to the purpose of the declaration of 
interest in relation to the tender process in question’.158 The CC in AllPay thus 
reaffirms this. 
A notable concern with this test is that, whilst it may assist lawyers and 
judges in determining the lawfulness or otherwise of a tender award once a 
dispute has arisen, it may be of little assistance to administrators tasked with 
the awarding thereof. We have already seen how unwieldy the procurement 
                                                          
155 Ibid para 92. 
156 Ibid para 22. 
157 2008 (2) SA 481 (SCA). 
158 Ibid para 19. 
61 
 
framework is. Accordingly, there may be any number of provisions relevant to 
the award of a specific tender. Working out the purpose of a provision, if there 
is in fact only one, may not be workable in practice. The purpose of a certain 
provision may also not be clear. This is problematic as administrators should be 
able to rely on clear provisions to guide their decision-making, and to maximise 
the incidence of legality of those decisions made. The procurement framework 
is anything but clear. Throwing into the mix an enquiry into the purpose of those 
provisions may add more complexity and confusion to an already complex 
and confused area of law. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The legal framework of government procurement, and therefore the 
framework within which lawfulness is to be determined, is unwieldy and overly 
complex. As the CC noted in AllPay: 
‘Section 217 of the Constitution, the Procurement Act and the Public 
Finance Management Act provide the constitutional and legislative 
framework within which administrative action may be taken in the 
procurement process’.159 
Given such a framework within which to work, it is little wonder that 
‘[c]ases concerning tenders in the public sphere are coming before the courts 
with disturbing frequency’.160 Although the courts in almost every tender 
dispute recognise at the outset that s 217 of the Constitution governs the 
enquiry, it is not always clear what this means. At times lawfulness is determined 
solely by reference to s 217, although it may also be determined on the basis 
of non-compliance with specific legislative provisions. 
The courts have also at times failed to separate the issues of unlawfulness 
and remedy, which led to the idea that the consequences of declaring an 
award invalid may to some extent count as reason not to find the award 
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unlawful. This has been rectified by the CC in AllPay. Remedial concerns are 
not relevant to the determination of lawfulness. 
Once a court has declared an award unlawful, it must then engage with 
the question of a just and equitable remedy, which to a large extent concerns 
the decision of whether or not to set aside the unlawful award. This 
determination must take into account a number of potentially conflicting 
considerations. Given that a court may decline to set aside such an award, 
which itself was an infringement of the principle of legality, such a decision 





THE SETTING ASIDE OF UNLAWFUL GOVERNMENT 
PROCUREMENT AWARDS 
4.1 Introduction 
Aggrieved bidders would no doubt expect a court to set aside an unlawful 
tender award. After all, the courts have a duty to provide effective relief in the 
event that the breach of a right is shown. The aggrieved bidder, in addition to 
the costs incurred in litigating and proving the unlawfulness of the award, may 
have also won the tender, had it not been awarded unlawfully. 
However, in deciding whether or not to set aside an unlawful tender 
award, the courts must take into account more than just these considerations. 
For example, there may be practical difficulties involved in setting aside the 
award. Furthermore, it may be that the interests of the aggrieved bidder are 
not the only interests relevant to the court’s determination. Ultimately, the 
court’s task may not be an easy one, especially since unlawful tender awards 
infringe the principle of legality. 
4.2 The right/s infringed in unlawful tender awards 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Typically, it will be the infringement of a legal right which induces a litigant 
to seek legal redress and which justifies a court granting that party some form 
of relief.1 The purpose of a remedy, then, is to provide some form of redress for 
the party who suffered due to the breach of a legal right.2 Accordingly, the 
remedy granted would then seem to depend at least to some extent on the 
nature of the right infringed and the nature of the interests being vindicated. 
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To properly understand a remedy it is therefore important to also understand 
the nature of the right infringed. 
In cases concerning unlawful tender awards the litigant approaching the 
court is almost always an aggrieved tenderer,3 which suggests that any right 
infringed in these cases is one held by that tenderer. As the tender process 
constitutes administrative action4 unsuccessful tenderers invariably plead the 
breach of the right to just administrative action when seeking relief. Arguably, 
then, the right infringed in such cases is simply that of just administrative action, 
contained in s 33 of the Constitution5 and given effect to by the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act6 (the PAJA). However, two features of South African 
public procurement suggest that the right infringed in unlawful tender awards 
may be something more than simply just administrative action. 
4.2.2 A right over and above just administrative action 
In order to ensure government tenders are awarded fairly, the legal 
framework makes use of a points system in that it prescribes that tenders must 
be awarded to the tenderer who scores the most points. The Preferential 
Procurement Policy Framework Act7 (the PPPFA) stipulates that ‘the contract 
must be awarded to the tenderer who scores the highest points unless 
objective criteria...justify the award to another tenderer’.8 The regulations 
promulgated in terms of the PPPFA repeat this requirement.9 In the municipal 
sphere, the Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act10 (the 
MFMA) stipulates that ‘each municipal entity must have and implement a 
supply chain management policy which gives effect to the provisions of [that] 
Part’.11 The regulations promulgated in terms of s 111 stipulate that the supply 
                                                          
3 Moseme Road Construction CC and Others v King Civil Engineering Contractors (Pty) Ltd and 
Another 2010 (4) SA 359 (SCA) para 1. 
4 Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO and Others 2003 (2) SA 460 (SCA) para 5. 
5 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
6 Act 3 of 2000. 
7 Act 5 of 2000. 
8 Ibid s 2(1)(f). 
9 GN 9544 in GG 34350 of 8 June 2011 reg 6(5) read with reg 7(1). 
10 Act 56 of 2003. 
11 Ibid s 111. 
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chain management policy of a municipality must be ‘consistent with other 
applicable legislation’,12 other applicable legislation being defined to include 
the PPPFA.13 Likewise, the regulations14 promulgated in terms of the Public 
Finance Management Act15 (the PFMA) – which applies to procurement in the 
national and provincial spheres – states that the supply chain management 
system adopted in terms thereof ‘must...be consistent with the [PPPFA]’.16 
Read together, the upshot of these requirements is that all national, 
provincial, and municipal supply chain management policies must provide 
that tenders are to be awarded to the bidder scoring the highest number of 
points unless objective criteria justify otherwise. This would seem to impose a 
duty on the relevant administrator to award any tender to that tenderer who 
in fact scores the most points, assuming there are no objective criteria justifying 
otherwise. Arguably, the tenderer scoring the most points then has a legal right 
to receive that tender for which they bid, in addition to the right to just 
administrative action. 
RHI Joint Venture v The Minister of Roads and Public Works, Eastern Cape 
and Others17 is instructive in this regard. In this case the tender forming the 
subject matter of the dispute was awarded not to the bidder scoring the most 
points, namely RHI,18 but to another bidder. The court found that the body 
awarding the tender had acted unlawfully in that it had awarded the tender 
on the basis of criteria which could not be considered objective in terms of the 
PPPFA.19 Importantly, the court noted that ‘had the Tender Board applied the 
provisions of the PPPF Act in a proper manner, it was obliged to award the 
tender to the applicant’.20 In making this statement the court clearly suggests, 
firstly, that the PPPFA requires tenders to be awarded to those bidders who 
                                                          
12 GN 868 in GG 27636 of 30 May 2005 reg 2(1)(d). 
13 Ibid reg 1. 
14 GN 225 in GG 27388 of 15 March 2005. 
15 Act 1 of 1999. 
16 Reg 16A3.2(b). 
17 2003 (5) BCLR 544 (Ck). 
18 Ibid para 9. 
19 Ibid para 40. 
20 Ibid para 49. 
66 
 
score the most points and, secondly, that administrators awarding tenders 
have an obligation to award the tender to the bidder scoring the most points, 
provided there are no objective criteria justifying otherwise. 
4.2.3 Awarding a tender to an initially unsuccessful tenderer 
The second aspect of tender disputes that suggests a right in addition to 
that of just administrative action is that in some cases the courts order that the 
contract be awarded to the unsuccessful bidder who, but for the unlawful 
award, would have received the tender. Again in the case of RHI Joint Venture 
the court, upon finding the award of the tender forming the subject matter of 
the dispute to be unlawful, ordered that the tender be awarded to the 
applicant.21 
Likewise, in Trencon (Pty) Ltd v The Industrial Development Corporation of 
South Africa Limited and Another22 Trencon had both scored the most points23 
and been recommended for the award.24 Despite this, the IDC had awarded 
the tender to another bidder. The High Court found the award to be unlawful 
on the basis that the decision to do so was influenced by a material error of 
law25 and awarded the tender to Trencon. On appeal, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal (SCA) reversed this order on the basis that no exceptional 
circumstances existed to justify awarding the tender to Trencon.26 However, on 
a further appeal, the Constitutional Court (CC) reinstated the order of the High 
Court that Trencon be awarded the tender, on the basis that the court was ‘in 
as good a position as the IDC to award the tender to Trencon’,27 and that the 
                                                          
21 Ibid para 51. 
22 (NGHC) unreported case no 58961/12 and 70100/12 (3 June 2013). 
23 Ibid para 49. 
24 Ibid para 50. 
25 Ibid para 44. 
26 Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd v Trencon Construction (Pty) Ltd 
and Another [2014] 4 All SA 561 (SCA) para 20. 
27 Trencon Construction (Pty) Ltd v Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd 
and Another 2015 (5) SA 245 (CC) para 57-58. 
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decision to award the tender to Trencon was ultimately a ‘foregone 
conclusion’.28 
4.2.4 The rejection of a right to be awarded a government tender 
The preceding discussions show that it is at least arguable that a bidder 
who scores the most points in a tender process has a legal entitlement to 
receive that award, over and above the right to just administrative action. 
Such a right also seems distinct from the right to just administrative action. 
However, this idea has not been emphatically accepted, and the SCA seems 
to have rejected it. In Moseme Road Construction CC and Others v King Civil 
Engineering Contractors (Pty) Ltd and Another29 the SCA had to consider 
whether the court a quo was correct in holding that the tender had been 
unlawfully awarded to the successful bidder and that the relevant 
administrator ‘was obliged to award the contract’ to the unsuccessful 
bidder.30 The court ultimately found that the court a quo erred in both respects 
and that the unsuccessful tenderer in this case ‘was not as a matter of law 
entitled to the contract’.31 
Moseme, however, must be read with caution when approaching the 
question of whether an unsuccessful tenderer who objectively scores the most 
points has a legal right to such award. The principal reason the SCA found that 
the unsuccessful tenderer was not entitled to the contract was that its bid did 
not in fact comply with the relevant regulations and should have been 
disqualified.32 As such, although Moseme certainly suggests that tenderers do 
not acquire a right to receive a tender for which they bid, this is not the ratio 
of the decision. Moseme therefore does not answer the question of whether 
an unsuccessful tenderer has such a right. It only leaves us wondering whether 
                                                          
28 Ibid para 71. 
29 Supra note 3 para 1. 
30 Ibid para 12. 
31 Ibid para 14. 
32 Ibid para 14. 
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the unsuccessful tenderer concerned would have had a legal entitlement to 
the contract had it complied with the regulations. 
The SCA’s judgment in AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd 
and Others v Chief Executive Officer, South African Social Security Agency and 
Others33 provides probably the strongest suggestion so far that an unsuccessful 
bidder does not have a legal right to receive a contract for which they bid. In 
its judgment the SCA held that ‘bidders do not have a right to a contract’ and 
that there is no ‘basis upon which a bidder could be said to have a legitimate 
expectation of being heard in the course of a tender evaluation’.34 These 
statements seem to reject emphatically the notion that an unsuccessful bidder 
in tender disputes could have any right over and above that of the right to just 
administrative action. 
Ultimately, it seems that aggrieved bidders do not have a right to receive 
a tender award on the strength of a tender which scores the highest points. 
This is despite both what the procurement framework suggests and the fact 
that in some cases the courts award disputed tenders to such bidders. 
Furthermore, aggrieved bidders already have recourse in the guise of the PAJA 
and breach of the right to just administrative action. Indeed, this seems to 
make it unnecessary to recognise any such further right to receive a tender 
award, as there already exists a developed legal framework within which to 
resolve these disputes. The implication of this is that receiving a tender award 
as a result of lawful administrative action is probably best regarded as a 
consequence of the right to just administrative action, and not the content of 
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4.3 The courts’ approach to setting aside unlawful tender awards 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Tender disputes are constitutional in nature.35 As such, the remedial stage 
is governed by s 172 of the Constitution, which states that ‘[w]hen deciding a 
constitutional matter within its power, a court…may make any order that is just 
and equitable’.36 The PAJA, which also finds application due to the 
administrative nature of the award process, similarly prescribes that a court 
‘may grant any order that is just and equitable’.37 The only order that a court is 
obliged to make is to declare any unconstitutional conduct invalid. This is 
because s 172 states that a court ‘must declare that any…conduct that is 
inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of the inconsistency’.38 
Apart from the obligation to declare unlawful tender awards invalid, the courts 
in tender disputes clearly enjoy a wide discretion when making an order. 
The remedy with which we are primarily concerned is the setting aside of 
an unlawful tender award. This remedy is particularly noteworthy due not only 
to its practical effect and obvious appeal to an unsuccessful tenderer, but also 
the fact that by and large this form of relief is what unsuccessful tenderers seek 
when taking the decision to award a tender on review.39 The setting aside of 
an award is also a necessary precondition to the unsuccessful tenderer having 
another chance at obtaining the contract. Applications for the judicial review 
of government tender awards are thus invariably concerned with the setting 
aside of those awards. 
The starting point of any enquiry into the remedial stage of a tender 
dispute is s 8 of the PAJA. Time and again courts begin their remedial 
                                                          
35 Constitution, 1996 s 217. 
36 S 172(1)(b). 
37 S 8(1). 
38 S 172(1)(a). 
39 See Moseme supra note 3 para 1 where Harms DP states that ‘[c]ourts…are swamped with 
unsuccessful tenderers that seek to have the award of contracts set aside and for the 
contracts to be awarded to them’. 
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determinations with this provision.40 Both the setting aside of an unlawful tender 
award and the granting of a tender award to the unsuccessful tenderer are 
contemplated as remedies in s 8.41 However, whether or not a court will grant 
either or both of these remedies depends on whether it would be just and 
equitable to do so.42 
4.3.2 The setting aside of an unlawful tender award as a just and equitable 
remedy 
The remedial stage in tender disputes is said to entail a ‘process of striking 
a balance between the applicant’s interests, on the one hand, and the 
interests of the respondents, on the other’.43 Furthermore, the public interest 
necessarily has a role to play in this determination.44 In Millennium Waste 
Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson, Tender Board: Limpopo Province and 
Others45 the court pointed out that an order setting aside an unlawful tender 
contract 
‘can have catastrophic consequences for an innocent tenderer, and 
adverse consequences for the public at large…Those interests must be 
carefully weighed against those of the disappointed tenderer if an order 
is to be made that is just and equitable’.46  
Similarly, in Sanyathi Civil Engineering and Construction (Pty) Ltd v 
eThekwini Municipality, Group 5 Construction (Pty) Ltd v eThekwini 
Municipality47 the court held that courts must ‘strike a balance between the 
                                                          
40 See for example Millennium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson, Tender Board: 
Limpopo Province and Others 2008 (2) SA 481 (SCA) para 22; Rainbow Civils CC v Minister of 
Transport and Public Works, Western Cape and Another (WCHC) unreported case 21158/12 (6 
February 2013) para 115; and Sanyathi Civil Engineering and Construction (Pty) Ltd v eThekwini 
Municipality, Group 5 Construction (Pty) Ltd v eThekwini Municipality (KZPHC) unreported case 
7538/11 (24 October 2011) para 100. 
41 S 8(1)(c). 
42 S 8(1). 
43 Millennium Waste Management supra note 40 para 22. 
44 Ibid para 23. Also see Rainbow Civils supra note 40 para 115 where it was stated that the 
exercise of the court’s discretion to grant any remedy that is just and equitable ‘involves a 
balancing between the interest of the disappointed tenderer, the interests of the successful 
tenderer, and the interests of the public at large’. 
45 Supra note 40. 
46 Ibid para 23. 
47 Supra note 40. 
71 
 
interests of the administrative body, the unsuccessful tenderers, the successful 
tenderer and…the public’.48 
4.3.2.1 The unsuccessful tenderer’s interests 
The interests of the unsuccessful tenderer are relatively clear. Firstly, the 
unsuccessful tenderer’s right to just administrative action is undermined in an 
unlawful tender process. Secondly, the unsuccessful tenderer has a very real 
commercial interest in being given a fair opportunity to bid for a public tender 
contract. The unsuccessful tenderer may also rely heavily on government 
contracts to sustain its business, and may even be performing the type of work 
to be done in the tender under an already existing contract. In such a case 
they would have a very real interest in being awarded the new tender 
contract in order to continue with the type of work already being performed. 
4.3.2.2 The successful tenderer’s interests 
Whether or not any interests of the successful tenderer are to be taken into 
account would seem to depend on whether or not the successful tenderer 
was either innocent or somehow complicit in the unlawfulness of the award. In 
the latter scenario it is unlikely that the interests of the successful tenderer would 
have any bearing on the determination of whether or not to set aside the 
award. In Millennium Waste Management the unsuccessful tenderer had been 
unlawfully excluded from the tender process. The court noted that if the 
successful tenderer ‘was complicit in some way in bringing about the exclusion 
of the tender…it would have been appropriate to set aside the decision for 
that reason alone’.49 Accordingly, it would seem that only those interests of an 
innocent successful tenderer are to be taken into account in determining a 
just and equitable remedy. 
The most obvious interest relevant to an innocent successful tenderer in 
such cases relates to whether or not the tenderer will retain the contract or lose 
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it. The extent of this interest would also depend on whether the successful 
tenderer has already started performing in terms of the contract and incurred 
any expense in doing so. Again, in Millennium Waste Management, the court 
noted that the 
‘decision to accept a tender is almost always acted upon immediately by 
the conclusion of a contract with the tenderer, and that is often followed 
by further contracts concluded by the tenderer in executing the 
contract’.50 
In fact, in such cases it would seem that the successful tenderer becomes 
‘obliged to perform’ under the contract they have been awarded.51 In 
Steenkamp NO v The Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape52 it was noted in 
the minority judgment that ‘[a] successful tenderer...is a bearer of obligations 
to comply with the contractual obligations it undertakes once the tender has 
been awarded’.53 
4.3.2.3 The public interest 
When dealing with the interests of the different parties hoping to acquire 
procurement contracts, it must be remembered that ‘[p]ublic procurement is 
not a mere showering of public largesse on commercial enterprises. It is the 
acquisition of goods and services for the benefit of the public’ the interests of 
which are ‘as material’ to the determination of the dispute as are those of the 
parties thereto.54 In fact, the public interest is arguably the most important 
interest taken into consideration in determining whether or not to set aside an 
unlawful tender award.55 
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This is perhaps easy to overlook, given that the parties in tender disputes 
are generally the unsuccessful tenderer, the successful tenderer, and the 
relevant public body awarding the tender. Unsuccessful tenderers also 
typically allege a breach of their own rights, and not any direct wrong to the 
public. However, to focus solely or even primarily on the rights of an aggrieved 
tenderer is to lose sight of the broader public interests which government 
tenders are meant to serve. As such, a court fashioning an appropriate remedy 
must take these broader interests into account. As the CC noted in its ‘remedy 
judgment’ in AllPay, 
‘[t]he primacy of the public interest in procurement...must also be taken 
into account when the rights, responsibilities, and obligations of all 
affected persons are assessed. This means that the enquiry cannot be 
one-dimensional. It must have a broader range’.56 
The public interest itself consists of a number of different, sometimes 
‘competing considerations’.57 On the one hand there is the consideration of 
legality which ‘undoubtedly requires that administrative action be lawful’.58 
This consideration is rooted in the idea that the public has a very real and 
significant interest in public officials complying with, and obeying, the law. It is 
in the public interest that administrators do not exceed the bounds of their 
authority. On the other hand there is the consideration of certainty which 
‘requires finality of administrative decisions and the exercise of administrative 
functions’.59 This consideration is informed by the notion that the public often 
acts on the basis of administrative acts and should be able to assume that such 
acts are lawful.60 If members of the public cannot have confidence in the 
belief that those administrative actions on which they base their decisions are 
lawful, obvious problems relating to uncertainty and insecurity over one’s own 
position can arise.61 
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The consideration of finality is also said to include ‘considerations of 
pragmatism and practicality’.62 To a large extent this concerns the feasibility of 
setting aside a contract on the strength of which the successful tenderer has 
already started performing. Two other significant public interests relevant to 
the determination of whether or not to set aside unlawful tender awards are, 
firstly, the financial burden associated with this course of action and, secondly, 
the disruption caused by setting aside the contract, particularly with regard to 
those meant to benefit from the services or goods procured. 
Considerations such as these were central to the court’s decision not to 
set aside a tender award in Chairperson, Standing Tender Committee and 
Others v JFE Sapela Electronics (Pty) Ltd and Others.63 This was despite the fact 
that the court found the award to be unlawful64 and that the unsuccessful 
tenderer applying for the review was ‘not in any way to blame for a delay in 
initiating proceedings or bringing them to finality’.65 Ultimately, ‘the 
impracticability of attempting to start the tender process over again for the 
completion of the remaining work’ if the contract were set aside would be 
both ‘disruptive’ and ‘give rise to a host of problems’.66 
Likewise, in Millennium Waste Management, a case concerning a tender 
‘for the provision of services relating to the removal, treatment and disposal of 
healthcare waste material from hospitals’,67 the disruption that would occur 
were such tender contract to be set aside played a central role in the court’s 
determination.68 In the court’s view ‘[t]he removal and disposal of medical 
waste must be carried out without interruption’.69 Ultimately, the court ordered 
that the tender contract be set aside only if, on a re-evaluation of the 
appellant’s tender, its tender ought to have been accepted,70 thus ‘taking into 
                                                          
62 Rainbow Civils supra note 40 para 116. 
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68 Ibid para 28. 
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account the public interest’ in not having the services in question being 
interrupted.71 
AllPay provides a good example of how public contracts can be so 
significant and of such magnitude that to set them aside would result in 
‘immense disruption…with dire consequences to millions of the elderly, 
children and the poor’.72 In that case, it will be recalled, the High Court had 
found the award in question to be unlawful.73 However, despite this finding, it 
decided not to set aside the award.74 Its reasons for doing so were essentially 
that any legality concerns were outweighed by the danger inherent in the 
likelihood that the payments of social grants would be interrupted.75 Although 
the SCA, on appeal, did not find that the tender award in question was 
unlawful,76 the following statement from the court, referring to the amicus 
curiae’s concern in the event that the award should be set aside, is telling: 
‘they had no cause for concern. It is unthinkable that that should occur’.77 
In Rainbow Civils the court considered the ‘crucial consideration’ in 
deciding whether or not to set aside an unlawful tender contract to be the 
fact that no work relating to the tender had been performed and that, 
accordingly, no public expenditure had yet taken place.78 As such, setting 
aside the tender ‘would not…result in any loss to the public purse through 
waste or duplication’.79 
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4.3.3 Weighing the various interests relevant to setting aside an unlawful 
tender award 
As we have already seen, the setting aside of a tender award could have 
‘catastrophic consequences’ for the successful tenderer,80 and possibly also 
for any number of innocent contractors further down the contractual chain. In 
addition, the various public interests must also be considered. The question 
which then presents itself is how all these different interests are to be weighed 
in the court’s determination of whether or not to set aside an unlawful tender 
award. 
In Millennium Waste Management the interests of the successful tenderer 
were clearly an important, albeit not the overriding, consideration in such 
determination.81 In contrast, in Rainbow Civils the position of the innocent 
successful tenderer did not carry much weight in the court’s determination.82 
To a large extent this would seem to be because the expenses incurred by the 
successful tenderer were for assets that could still be utilised by the business in 
future.83 As such, the court did not consider these expenses, or even ‘the failure 
to submit a tender for another contract’,84 as ‘constitut[ing] real prejudice…in 
the sense of a detrimental alteration of [the successful tenderer]’s position in 
anticipation of the validity of the tender award’.85 In addition, whilst the 
successful tenderer in Rainbow Civils was innocent in the sense that it did not 
have a hand in bringing about the unlawfulness of the award, it ‘was the 
author of its own misfortunes’ in that it failed to ensure its tender was not 
irregular.86 
The weight accorded to the disruption caused by the setting aside of an 
unlawful tender contract differs depending on the nature and extent of both 
                                                          
80 Millennium Waste Management supra note 40 para 23. 
81 Ibid para 27. 




86 Ibid para 125. 
77 
 
the service and the disruption. In Millennium Waste Management, the 
disruption was accorded significant weight as the nature of the service was 
crucial, namely the management and disposal of medical waste.87 On the 
other hand, in Rainbow Civils the disruption to be caused by setting aside the 
contract was accorded little weight.88 The difference had to do with the facts 
in each case. In Millennium Waste Management the province of Limpopo 
would not itself have been able to provide the services forming the content of 
the tender contract should such contract be set aside,89 whereas in Rainbow 
Civils the service in question, namely ‘the daily cleaning of some 133 schools 
and 13 clinics, and the clearing of vacant provincial land of vegetation and 
refuse’,90 had to date been carried out by the relevant department who could 
continue to do so should the contract be set aside.91 In addition, almost no 
weight was accorded to the fact that the necessary employees would not 
benefit from the employment generated by the contract in Rainbow Civils 
should it be set aside.92 
Ultimately, the weight to be accorded to the interests of a specific 
tenderer would depend on the facts of the case, whether the tenderer had 
taken steps to protect its position or mitigate its loss, and the extent of the 
prejudice suffered by the tenderer were the award to be set aside. The weight 
accorded to various public interests is also fact specific, depending to a large 
extent on the nature and degree of the harm and the likelihood of it occurring 
should the award be set aside. 
In the event that the harm involved in setting aside an unlawful tender 
award outweighs legality considerations, a court will in all likelihood decline to 
set aside that award. Given the apparent conflict that exists with such an 
order, such an approach calls for justification. 
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4.4  Justifying the decision to allow an unlawful tender award to stand 
4.4.1  Ubi jus, ibi remedium 
There is a line of thought, especially in the constitutional context, which 
emphasises the need for a remedy in the event of a breach or infringement of 
one’s right. This can be expressed as ‘ubi jus, ibi remedium’ – translated as 
‘[w]here there’s a right, there must be a remedy’.93 The idea that rights must 
have remedies is informed by the functions which remedies perform, namely 
that they ‘define abstract rights and enforce otherwise intangible rights’.94 In 
other words, remedies give effect to rights. Without a remedy, a right is either 
meaningless, useless, or both. As Bishop notes, ‘[t]here would be no point in 
possessing a right, in terms of law, that offered no relief to the person who 
sought its enforcement’.95 
We can see the force in this argument more clearly if one considers what 
the nature of rights would be in the absence of any remedies. As Thomas 
explains, without remedies rights would lose their ‘enforcement power’ and 
would ‘simply become something that one should do, but not something that 
one is compelled to do’.96 The danger in this is that, in the absence of remedies, 
the normative force of legal rights would become watered down to such an 
extent that ‘rights may simply be ignored’.97 Zeigler, in exploring the normative 
aspect of why rights should have remedies, goes so far as to say that ‘a right 
without a remedy is not a legal right; it is merely a hope or a wish’.98 In addition, 
a duty that cannot be enforced ‘is not really a duty; it is only a voluntary 
obligation that a person can fulfil or not at his whim’.99 Accordingly, it would 
seem that the ability to enforce one’s rights through obtaining a remedy is 
                                                          
93 Tracy Thomas ‘Ubi jus, ibi remedium: The Fundamental Right to a Remedy Under Due Process’ 
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94 Ibid at 1638. 
95 Bishop op cit note 1 at 9-7. 
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what moves rights from the realm of prospect to that of certainty, and duties 
from the realm of discretionary to that of obligatory. 
The claim that rights should have remedies is also informed by the purposes 
which rights are thought to serve. Rights ensure the regulation of social 
behaviour and advance individual well-being.100 Importantly, rights also ‘assist 
society in treating people equally’ and promote order and predictability, thus 
enabling people to act upon reasonable expectations in managing their 
affairs’.101 When rights are not given effect in the form of a remedy there are 
consequences. Firstly, the denial of a remedy in the event of a breach thereof 
sends a signal that such breach is ‘acceptable’ and that the victim ‘lacks 
worth’.102 Secondly, in those situations where some are granted remedies for 
certain violations but others are not, issues of unequal application of the law 
arise.103 
The likelihood that a remedy will be forthcoming in the event one’s right is 
breached also has implications for the deterrence of similar breaches in future. 
This is because the presence of an effective remedy would seem to be a 
consideration in any would-be transgressor’s evaluation of whether or not to 
breach another’s rights. In the absence of any effective remedy, the pool of 
reasons for not so transgressing is diminished. In other words, one has less reason 
to respect the rights of others if there is unlikely to be an effective remedy 
forthcoming in the event that one breaches another’s rights. 
It would seem, then, that remedies perform at least two functions: they 
vindicate present breaches of rights, and they go some way to deterring future 
breaches of rights. In the context of government procurement the significance 
of these insights would seem to be as follows. Firstly, setting aside an unlawful 
tender award provides the necessary relief to vindicate the right to just 
administrative action of the unsuccessful tenderer. Without this relief the 
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unsuccessful tenderer would have suffered a violation of rights and been 
afforded no remedy, rendering the right to just administrative action 
nugatory.104 It also sends the signal that tenderers must be treated equally and, 
as a result, fairly – as required by s 217 of the Constitution. 
Secondly, administrators awarding tenders are more likely to ensure that 
tenders are awarded lawfully – a deterrence of future breaches – if they have 
reason to believe that a remedy, in the form of an order setting aside the 
tender contract, will be forthcoming in the event that a tender is awarded 
unlawfully. This proposition is of course open to doubt on various grounds.105 
However, as Levinson notes, ‘government officials in many contexts will be less 
likely to respect constitutional rights that are not backed by remedies’.106 
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In South African law the locus classicus of the idea that a right requires a 
remedy is found in Minister of the Interior and Another v Harris and Others107 
where the court stated 
‘[t]here can to my mind be no doubt that the authors of the Constitution 
intended that those rights should be enforceable by the Courts of Law. 
They could never have intended to confer a right without a remedy. The 
remedy is, indeed, part and parcel of the right. Ubi jus, ibi remedium’.108 
This statement has since been affirmed by the CC. In August and Another 
v Electoral Commission and Others,109 in which the CC concluded that denying 
prisoners the ability to vote breached their constitutional right to do so,110 the 
court relied on this passage in emphasising the need for a remedy.111 Clearly, 
then, the idea that a right requires a remedy is part of modern South African 
constitutional law. However, it is open to doubt that the ‘ubi jus, ibi remedium’ 
principle, and its adoption in South African law, can mean that a remedy 
which fully vindicates the breach of a right must be forthcoming in every 
dispute. 
4.4.2 Interest Balancing and Rights Maximising 
In analysing the courts’ discretion in refusing to set aside an unlawful 
tender award it is useful to consider the following passage of the CC in Fose v 
Minister of Safety and Security:112 
‘[T]his Court has a particular duty to ensure that, within the bounds of the 
Constitution, effective relief be granted for the infringement of any of the 
rights entrenched in it. In our context an appropriate remedy must mean 
an effective remedy, for without effective remedies for breach, the values 
underlying and the right entrenched in the Constitution cannot properly 
be upheld or enhanced. Particularly in a country where so few have the 
means to enforce their rights through the courts, it is essential that on those 
occasions when the legal process does establish that an infringement of 
an entrenched right has occurred, it be effectively vindicated. The courts 
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have a particular responsibility in this regard and are obliged to 'forge new 
tools' and shape innovative remedies, if needs be, to achieve this goal’.113 
The preceding passage is clearly an endorsement of the ubi jus, ibi 
remedium principle, subject to certain limitations. With regard to the courts’ 
duty to afford victims effective relief, we see that this duty is constrained by the 
‘bounds of the Constitution’. This clearly suggests a limitation on the principle 
of effective relief and indicates that whether or not effective relief will be 
forthcoming in a particular case depends on whether or not there are other 
provisions in the Constitution which serve to limit such relief. Furthermore, the 
court in Fose emphasises that relief should not lightly be withheld on account 
that a remedy may not be apparent, and that courts should be creative in 
providing relief. Fose is therefore authority for the proposition that courts have 
a duty to do all they can to provide a remedy where a case for doing so has 
been made out, and should be slow to deny a remedy unless there are very 
good reasons for doing so. 
In Hoffmann v South African Airways114 the CC gave further content to the 
notion of appropriate relief, when it held that 
‘“appropriate relief” must be construed purposively, and in the light of s 
172(1)(b), which empowers the Court, in constitutional matters, to make 
“any order that is just and equitable”. Thus construed, appropriate relief 
must be fair and just in the circumstances of the particular case. Indeed, 
it can hardly be said that relief that is unfair or unjust is appropriate’.115 
Furthermore, 
‘[f]airness requires a consideration of the interests of all those who might 
be affected by the order. In the context of employment, this will require a 
consideration not only of the interests of the prospective employee but 
also the interests of the employer. In other cases, the interests of the 
community may have to be taken into consideration’.116 
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Accordingly, the court held that ‘[t]he determination of appropriate relief, 
therefore, calls for the balancing of the various interests that might be affected 
by the remedy’.117 
The court in Hoffmann thus explicitly acknowledges that the notion of 
fairness relevant to the enquiry involves fairness not only to the plaintiff or 
applicant to the dispute, but also fairness to the opposing party. Perhaps more 
importantly, the notion of fairness may, depending on the circumstances, 
require fairness to other persons not party to the dispute and who may have a 
very real interest in the outcome thereof. 
Importantly, with regard to the balancing process required in the 
determination of a just and equitable remedy, the court in Hoffmann held that 
‘[t]he balancing process must at least be guided by the objective, first, to 
address the wrong occasioned by the infringement of the constitutional 
right; second, to deter future violations; third, to make an order that can 
be complied with; and fourth, of fairness to all those who might be 
affected by the relief. Invariably, the nature of the right infringed and the 
nature of the infringement will provide guidance as to the appropriate 
relief in the particular case’.118 
The CC has therefore clearly endorsed the idea that there may be a 
number of different and competing considerations to be taken into account, 
over and above those of the wronged party, in deciding what may constitute 
appropriate and effective relief. This is despite the ubi jus, ibi remedium 
principle forming part of South African constitutional law. This accords with the 
approach taken by the courts in deciding whether or not the setting aside of 
an unlawful tender award would constitute a just and equitable remedy. In 
those cases interests over and above those of the wronged tenderer are taken 
into account, and there may be other objectives in addition to the vindication 
of a right which are relevant. 
                                                          




The courts in tender disputes have therefore emphatically endorsed that 
remedial approach which Gerwitz calls ‘Interest Balancing’.119 This remedial 
approach is predicated on the idea that, especially in a constitutional context, 
there may be a number of competing interests all relevant to the 
determination of a just and equitable remedy.120 This approach is in contrast 
to that remedial approach Gerwitz calls ‘Rights Maximising’ which aims only to 
ensure that the victim of a breach of a right receives the most effective remedy 
possible, where efficacy is understood as ‘eliminating the adverse 
consequences of violations suffered by victims’121 and which resonates with 
the ubi jus, ibi remedium principle. The crucial distinction between the two 
approaches is that under Interest Balancing the relief afforded to the victim of 
a breach may be limited by any number of other interests relevant to the 
enquiry. However, with Rights Maximising the provision of effective relief to the 
victim is the only consideration deemed relevant to the enquiry; the concerns 
of other stakeholders do not serve to curtail the remedy afforded to the 
victim.122 
4.4.3 Preferring Interest Balancing over Rights Maximising 
There are a number of reasons why a court would opt for an Interest 
Balancing approach when determining a just and equitable remedy. As 
Gerwitz notes, ‘[w]hile it may seem that complete remedial effectiveness for 
victims is always possible…the complexities of the remedial enterprise 
undermine this view’.123 Two considerations in particular support this claim. 
Firstly, ‘there may be more than one legally relevant remedial goal’.124 The 
problem this poses for attaining the most effective remedy for the victim is that 
these goals may themselves conflict. In such a situation it may not be possible 
to achieve one legally relevant goal ‘without requiring some sacrifice of 
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another’.125 Judges are then ‘compelled to evaluate the relative importance 
of conflicting remedial goals’ and ‘choose which goals to compromise’.126 In 
tender disputes this tension is clearly felt where there is a threat of harm to a 
section of the public were an unlawful contract to be set aside. Avoiding harm 
to the public is clearly a remedial goal important enough to be at least 
considered alongside the interests of the unsuccessful tenderer in fashioning a 
just and equitable remedy. 
Secondly, a court may be prevented from granting a perfect remedy to 
the victim of a breach due to ‘instrumental difficulties in achieving remedial 
goals’.127 Whilst Gerwitz mentions this difficulty in the context of ‘an ambitious 
injunction’,128 the practical difficulties associated with setting aside unlawful 
tender awards are very real indeed. As we have already seen, where work has 
already started, or nearing its completion, setting aside the contract may be 
impractical. Moreover, where there is the potential for significant disruption 
should a contract be set aside the court may be inclined not to follow such a 
course of action. 
Gerwitz notes that despite the widespread adoption of Interest Balancing 
as a remedial approach in constitutional cases, it is not always acknowledged 
as ‘legitimate’.129 To a large extent this seems to be informed by the belief 
underlying Rights Maximising, namely that breaches of rights should be 
remedied as best they can.130 It would also seem to be much easier to justify a 
Rights Maximising approach.131 Such an approach also has intuitive appeal. It 
aims to grant as much relief as possible to the actual victim who has suffered 
as a result of a breach of their rights – which accords squarely with the idea of 
a remedy. Interest Balancing, on the other hand, brings to the fore 
considerations of those whose rights have not been infringed and who are not 
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victims, and allows these considerations to limit the remedy afforded to the 
actual victim. 
Another concern that presents itself when preferring Interest Balancing 
over Rights Maximising is that it ‘may lead the courts to approve a general 
conception of Interest Balancing that undervalues the importance of 
vindicating rights’.132 An important feature of constitutional rights is that they 
have been given their status as rights precisely because it is recognised that 
those values which inform them are important enough to warrant this form of 
protection. The adoption of Interest Balancing as a remedial approach may 
undermine this feature of rights and, accordingly, a ‘Constitution’s allocation 
of rights would be subject to a de novo utilitarian reevaluation in particular 
cases’.133 
It would seem that, despite these concerns, Interest Balancing as a 
remedial approach can be justified in a number of ways, especially in a 
constitutional context. Firstly, balancing different interests in fashioning a just 
and equitable remedy is in fact itself part and parcel of ‘equitable 
remedies’.134 Implicit in the notion of equity is fairness, which may involve ‘an 
appeal to substantive fairness’.135 Secondly, ‘vindicating a constitutional 
remedial interest may clash with another constitutional interest’.136 
Accordingly, when constitutional interests clash a court is forced to balance 
them as they have become relevant to the enquiry. It seems inimical to a 
constitutional enterprise to disregard those interests for which provision is made 
in a Constitution, and which stand to be implicated, when determining a just 
and equitable remedy. This point would seem to be related to the further idea 
that society has values and interests over and above that of remedial 
effectiveness.137 Given that society has other such values and interests it would 
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undermine those values and interests were they to be ignored in the 
determination of a just and equitable remedy. 
It should also be remembered that 
‘an effective remedy is often not possible without imposing significant and 
direct costs on selected third parties who are non-violators. Remedial 
burdens are easiest to justify when the cost-bearer of the remedy is also 
the wrongdoer who violated the [victim’s] rights’.138 
In the context of tender disputes, the setting aside of an unlawful tender 
could place significant financial burdens on the State, directly affecting the 
public in the process. Such a remedy, which while effective for the 
unsuccessful tenderer, could also have drastic and far reaching 
consequences for the intended beneficiaries of the good or service procured. 
AllPay is an excellent example of this. In the circumstances of this case a court, 
when fashioning a remedy, simply cannot fail to take into account the interests 
of millions of the country’s most vulnerable people reliant on government 
grants, and who are in no way to blame for the unlawfulness of the award. 
Given what has been said, in disputes such as those evidenced by AllPay, 
Interest Balancing is not merely the more appropriate remedial approach. It is 
in fact the only viable remedial approach. 
4.5  Conclusion 
When a public tender is awarded unlawfully the principle of legality is 
breached and the right to just administrative action of any other tenderers who 
submitted bids for that contract is infringed. For a tenderer who, but for the 
unlawful award, would have received the tender, the wrong or harm is that 
much more tangible. In deciding what constitutes a just and equitable 
remedy, however, the court does not focus solely or even primarily on the 
interests of any wronged tenderer. Instead, the courts take into account the 
broader interests of the public which stand to be affected by any interruption 
which may result from the setting aside of an unlawful tender award. 




The implication of this is that a court faced with an unlawful tender award 
may decide that setting the award aside does not constitute a just and 
equitable remedy, despite the unlawfulness of the award. That the courts may 
do this is not controversial; it is part of their administrative law discretion in 
determining a just and equitable remedy. 
However, justifying the courts’ power to do so requires more than the 
acknowledgment that this power exists, or that some interests outweigh others. 
One way of justifying the courts’ approach is to contrast the remedial 
approach of Rights Maximising with that of Interest Balancing. Although Rights 
Maximising may have some initial appeal given that it aims to fully vindicate 
the right infringed, we have seen that this is often simply not feasible. This is 
because, as Interest Balancing recognises, fully vindicating some rights may 
result in external harm. This becomes even more concerning when those who 
stand to be adversely affected are not to blame and, as in the case of 
government procurement awards, may even be those meant to benefit from 
the administrative act in question. Courts are therefore compelled to consider 
the broader public interest when deciding whether or not to set aside an 
unlawful tender award, especially when doing so could have implications for 
the rights of others. 
In this way, then, we may make sense of how to justify the courts’ making 
use of a balancing enquiry in deciding whether or not to set aside an unlawful 
tender award. However, this raises questions concerning the implications this 
may have for the principle of legality and the Rule of Law, the latter being a 





IMPLICATIONS OF UNLAWFUL TENDER AWARDS FOR THE 
PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW 
5.1 Introduction 
Allowing unlawful administrative decisions to stand presents a number of 
difficulties for a legal system dedicated to upholding the Rule of Law. In 
Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd and Others v Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd 
and Others1 the Constitutional Court (CC) regarded the refusal to set aside 
unlawful administrative decisions as capable of affecting both the principle of 
legality and the Rule of Law.2 Although the court did not elaborate, its 
comments are significant given the Rule of Law’s foundational status in the 
Constitution.3 This chapter will explore this issue in detail, and will seek to 
understand what these effects are and their implications. Furthermore, we will 
look at how a court may allow an unlawful tender award to stand despite its 
duty to uphold the Rule of Law. 
The Rule of Law has not been comprehensively defined in South African 
jurisprudence. As such, it is useful to consider it from both a theoretical 
perspective as well as how it has been developed by the courts to date. To a 
large extent the Rule of Law has been developed via the principle of legality. 
It will be argued that the key to answering the questions posed above lies in 
appreciating the nature of the Rule of Law and the principle of legality, and 
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5.2  The Rule of Law 
5.2.1 Contestation and uncertainty 
The Rule of Law is ‘an ancient political ideal’.4 Surprisingly, despite its 
ancient origins, its exact scope remains unclear.5 Instead, it is regarded as a 
‘contested’ and ambiguous concept6 and is often described as a ‘loaded 
term’,7 with its meaning dependent on the context in which it is used. This has 
led some commentators to regard it as devoid of any meaning whatsoever.8 
Beatty argues that the uncertainty and plethora of meanings associated with 
the Rule of Law has resulted in a ‘fuzzy and confused’ concept incapable of 
providing the necessary benchmark ‘against which the records of 
governments can be measured’.9 
Mathews, recognising the plethora of ‘conflicting…formulations of the 
Rule of Law’,10 draws attention to the fact that some of the blame for this can 
be laid at the doors of those ‘who seek to infuse it with a beneficent but vague 
and all-embracing philosophy’.11 By this, Mathews means that incorporating 
the Rule of Law with all the ideals of justice leaves us with a suspect12 and 
increasingly useless13 concept. These sentiments are echoed by Raz who states 
that if we insist that the Rule of Law incorporates such ideals then ‘the term 
lacks any useful function’.14 The danger in this is that the Rule of Law then 
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becomes watered down to the extent that it becomes a mere political slogan 
‘susceptible to being used for ideological purposes’.15 Accordingly, it ‘must be 
deployed with precision’.16 
Despite this contestation and uncertainty, attempts to accurately 
demarcate the boundaries of the Rule of Law remain important. As Craig 
notes, the Rule of Law is ‘a central principle of constitutional governance’.17 
For him, this is reason enough to ‘be as clear as possible about its meaning’.18 
Mathews regards the ‘necessity of reaching a clear understanding’ of the Rule 
of Law as ‘obvious’.19 In the South African context, the Rule of law is a 
foundational value of the Constitution.20 Given its importance, there is 
undoubtedly a need to properly understand it.21 
5.2.2 Understanding the Rule of Law 
At the very least, there is some consensus that the Rule of Law ‘requires 
[that] government officials and citizens be bound by and act consistently with 
the law’.22 For Bingham, the idea that officials in power must comply strictly 
with the law is ‘fundamental’ and ‘at the very heart of the rule of law’.23 
Mathews argues that this core idea is in fact the principle of legality.24 He 
states that the Rule of Law simply cannot be defined without legality as its 
central element.25 For Mathews, the importance of this aspect of the Rule of 
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Law is not merely its focus on government being constrained by law, but on 
‘the reign of law over [governmental] authority’.26 
Tamanaha argues that the Rule of Law is an inherent good.27 However, 
we would still want to know what makes the Rule of Law good in order to 
understand why we should value it. For Raz the value of the Rule of Law lies in 
its ability to do three things. Firstly, it guards against the exercise of arbitrary 
power.28 This does not mean that power can never be exercised arbitrarily in a 
society which subscribes to the Rule of Law. But it does mean that in such a 
society the likelihood of arbitrary rule taking hold would be reduced.29 
Secondly, the Rule of Law ensures ‘the protection of individual freedom’.30 It 
does this by providing ‘stable, secure frameworks’ for people so that they may 
conduct their lives with predictability and certainty.31 Thirdly, the Rule of Law 
ensures respect for human dignity.32 
5.2.3 Restraining governmental power 
The idea of the Rule of Law arose out of the realisation that democracy 
alone cannot keep tyranny at bay.33 A democratically elected government 
must also itself be subject to law, and there must be mechanisms in place to 
ensure the state’s compliance with the law. This aspect of the Rule of Law is 
informed by the perennial concern of holding to account those in power. 
Loughlin argues that the ‘dynamic between power and liberty’ has been 
the driving force behind constitutional development.34 He argues further that 
‘[s]ince the powers of government in the modern era are extensive, the key 
political value of liberty can be maintained only by ensuring that these powers 
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are confined, channeled, and checked’.35 As Krygier notes, ‘[i]f the laws are 
there but governments bypass them, it is not the law that rules’.36  Throughout 
history, as governments came to regulate more aspects of social life than they 
had before and the extent of their powers of coercion increased, so did the 
need arise for a check on these powers.37 This is especially true of 
governmental regulation which encroaches increasingly on the private sphere 
of life. 
The perennial problem of corruption in modern governments shows that 
there exists always a concern that ‘government officials may be unduly 
influenced in their government actions by inappropriate considerations’.38 The 
Rule of Law seeks to minimise this. Tamanaha argues that the Rule of Law serves 
to restrain the exercise of government power by, firstly, limiting what they may 
do and, secondly, prescribing how they must go about doing that which they 
are required or permitted to do.39 In doing so, the law imposes limits on the 
considerations for which such officials may act, thus reducing the risk that they 
will act for considerations not sanctioned by law. As we saw in Chapter 3 one 
of the reasons for adopting peremptory legislation in government procurement 
is to curtail corruption.40 
Arbitrary power, being the use of ‘public powers for private ends’,41 is 
further curtailed by laws that prescribe what laws may be promulgated. There 
can be no Rule of Law if officials are free to pass laws which only serve their 
own personal interests. As explained by Raz, ‘[t]he arbitrary use of power for 
personal gain, out of vengeance or favouritism is…drastically restricted by 
close adherence to the rule of law’.42 
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It would appear to be a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for 
the existence of the Rule of Law that public officials act in a manner that is in 
accordance with the law. This can be seen from Raz’s exposition on the 
difference between conforming to the law and complying with the law.43 
Briefly, conforming to the law means simply that one’s actions and the 
requirements of the law are congruent. On the other hand, compliance with 
the law means that one’s actions conform to the law ‘because it is recognized 
that one’s actions should conform to the law’.44 Only when the law is followed 
because it is recognised that the law must be followed may we say that law’s 
authority is respected and it is the law that rules. 
One problem which arises in holding governments to the requirement of 
legality is that it may at times frustrate them in their efforts to govern.45 However, 
the ability of a government to govern is not solely determined by the presence 
or absence of laws. It is also determined by, among other things, the presence 
or absence of political will and competent officials. Furthermore, if officials are 
frustrated in their attempts to govern due to a lack of laws with which they may 
comply one answer would be to promulgate the necessary enabling laws. It 
should also be remembered that effective governance is not the only value of 
modern society. The argument that the Rule of Law may serve to frustrate 
governments in their attempts to govern misses the point of why we value the 
Rule of Law in the first place, namely to provide a counterweight to the 
asymmetrical power of the state, and the dangers associated with it. 
5.2.4 Instrumental and substantive conceptions of the Rule of Law 
Radin argues that the contested nature of the Rule of Law stems in large 
part from ‘differences in emphasis of its instrumental and substantive 
aspects’.46 According to the instrumental version ‘the Rule of Law is a 
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prerequisite for any efficacious legal order’.47 In other words, the efficacy of a 
legal system requires, as a necessary precondition, the presence of the Rule of 
Law. Without it, a legal system would fail in its attempts to guide the behavior 
of those subject to it. Essentially, this means ‘there must be rules…capable of 
being followed’.48 Radin calls these two requirements ‘know-ability’ and 
‘perform-ability’.49 People must be able to know the rules to which they are 
subject, and those rules must be such that people are able to comply with 
them.50 
Loughlin persuasively argues that the instrumental version of the Rule of 
Law in fact more closely resembles ‘rule by law’ as opposed to rule of law.51 
On this conception, ‘law is the essential means through which the business of 
governing is conducted’.52 Although essential, this is merely ‘formal’.53 The 
instrumental version of the Rule of Law is, for Loughlin, unable to ensure that 
those in power are themselves subject to the law, as the rule by law is in fact 
the ‘rule of persons’.54 
Importantly, the instrumental version of the Rule of Law is not concerned 
with ‘more general constitutional values, such as those that flow from 
democracy or broader ideas of social justice’,55 ‘fairness…and autonomy or 
dignity of persons’.56 These are said to be ‘[s]ubstantive ideals’.57 As a result, it 
is often said that an autocratic regime is capable of adhering to the 
instrumental version of the Rule of Law precisely because, on this 
understanding, the Rule of Law does not require anything more than rules 
which are capable of being followed.58 The content of those rules and their 
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normative worth are of no concern to an instrumental understanding of the 
Rule of Law. As a result, Mathews regards such an understanding of the Rule of 
Law as ‘too empty and meaningless to be of any service’.59 
This has led to the idea that any adequate notion of the Rule of Law must 
incorporate certain substantive values. The substantive version of the Rule of 
Law ‘holds that the Rule of Law embodies tenets of a particular political 
morality’.60 To a large extent, the substantive version of the Rule of Law is 
premised on the promotion of liberalism.61 In order to promote liberty, assumed 
to be ‘the fundamental substantive value’, a legal system must possess certain 
characteristics, for example the absence of retrospective laws and the 
treating alike of like cases.62 In this way the government is restrained and the 
liberty of the individual is promoted. 
It is this characteristic of the substantive version of the Rule of Law that 
allows it to guard against autocracy. Loughlin argues that the substantive 
version of the Rule of Law is concerned with ‘legitimate political rule’ and 
‘curbing arbitrariness across the entire governing regime’.63 Given that liberty 
assumes a central position in the substantive version of the Rule of Law any 
institutional threat to liberty would need to be safeguarded against. The 
substantive version of the Rule of Law is said to do this by incorporating the 
separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary as central 
values.64 In this way power is dispersed rather than consolidated,65 and 
sufficient checks on such power are put in place.66 The possibility of power 
being monopolised is limited and autocratic possibilities are thereby 
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undermined.67 The danger posed to individual liberty by those with power is 
then also diminished. 
Why one would advocate for a substantive version of the Rule of Law is 
certainly understandable. The idea that the Rule of Law consists of important 
values over and above that of the state being subject to law is appealing for 
obvious reasons. If a substantive version of the Rule of Law is in fact ‘necessary 
to fairness, human dignity, freedom, and democracy’68 one would be hard-
pressed to argue against it. Furthermore, if the Rule of Law can be defined to 
incorporate values such as democracy and social justice, then a government 
bound by the Rule of Law would be bound by those values. However, it is not 
clear that this is in fact necessary. 
Despite the substantive version of the Rule of Law’s appeal, it would seem 
that an instrumental understanding of the concept still has much to commend 
it. Much of the credit for this can be given to Raz, who argues that ‘[t]he rule 
of law means literally what it says: The rule of the law’.69 Essentially, this means 
that ‘government shall be ruled by law and subject to it’.70 This conception of 
the Rule of Law would seem to be little more than the principle of legality. For 
Raz this conception of the Rule of Law consists of two things: firstly, that people 
obey the law and, secondly, that the law is such that it can in fact guide 
people’s behavior.71 
Raz argues that a number of principles flow from this basic formal 
conception of the Rule of Law and which he believes fall into two distinct 
groups. Without enumerating all of them, it is worth pointing out that, on the 
one hand, there are those principles which ensure that the law is capable of 
guiding behavior,72 for example that the law be clear, prospective, and 
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stable.73 On the other hand, there are principles which ensure that the ‘legal 
machinery of enforcing the law’ will not be ‘distorted’ and that the legal 
system maintains its ability to ‘supervis[e] conformity to the rule of law and 
provide effective remedies in cases of deviation from it’.74 Principles which 
would fall into this category include the independence of the judiciary being 
guaranteed and the power of the courts to review administrative action.75 Raz 
therefore contests the idea that judicial independence is the sole preserve of 
the substantive version of the Rule of Law. 
For Raz the Rule of Law ‘is not to be confused with democracy, justice, 
equality (before the law or otherwise), human rights of any kind or respect for 
persons or for the dignity of man’.76 Thinking of the Rule of Law in a way that 
incorporates such substantive ideals deprives the term of ‘any useful 
function’.77 Accordingly, for the Rule of Law to have any value it must be 
thought of in this narrow sense. 
Understandably, those who disagree with Raz’s separation thesis would 
argue that holding a government to a narrow conception of the Rule of Law 
would fail to guard against certain evils associated with such an asymmetric 
power relationship. Raz is aware of this and has the following to say: ‘the rule 
of law is just one of the virtues which a legal system may possess and by which 
it is to be judged’.78 This is an important and fundamental point. It illustrates the 
fact that one need not use the term Rule of Law to denote everything which is 
desirable in a legal system. In fact, there appear to be good reasons not to. 
The Rule of Law is certainly a valuable and desirable aspect of modern 
governance which has much to commend it. However, there are other 
equally, perhaps more, important values. It is unclear why we should think that 
all such values are somehow part of the Rule of Law. At the very least, insisting 
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that the Rule of Law consists of values such as democracy and open-ended 
ideals such as social justice can cause confusion. This is because we are then 
uncertain of the parameters of the Rule of Law and the concept becomes 
confused. Furthermore, substantive values such as democracy and equality 
are desirable for their own reasons, and it is for these reasons one may 
advocate their recognition and protection. Incorporating them into the Rule 
of Law in the hope that their stature and importance will be heightened as a 
result fails to appreciate this. 
5.2.5 The Rule of Law as an ideal 
Importantly, Raz notes that the Rule of Law ‘is a political ideal which a 
legal system may lack or may possess to a greater or lesser degree’.79 The 
extent to which a legal system succeeds in adhering to the Rule of Law is then 
itself ‘a matter of degree’.80 Loughlin, arguing along similar lines, goes so far as 
to say that the Rule of Law is an ideal which is in fact ‘unrealizable in 
practice’.81 This is not to say there is no value in the Rule of Law. There is, but 
‘only for its aspirational qualities’.82 Similarly, Endicott argues that 
‘[t]he rule of law is unattainable. Communities never achieve it 
completely…To the extent that officials do not conform to the law, the 
community fails to attain the ideal of the rule of law. Perhaps no 
community has even got very close to the ideal’.83 
To escape this conclusion, argues Endicott, would require a revision of the 
Rule of Law itself.84 
An appreciation of the Rule of Law being unattainable can go a long way 
to understanding how violations of the Rule of Law affect it. Given the 
overriding importance with which the Rule of Law is regarded, it is easy to 
assume that it must always be upheld. However, if the Rule of Law is in fact an 
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unrealizable ideal then this is certainly mistaken. Less than perfect adherence 
to the Rule of Law may also not necessarily be a bad thing. As long as a legal 
system as a whole strives towards, and generally succeeds in, upholding the 
Rule of Law deviations from it may be permitted. 
In certain circumstances it may even be desirable to permit deviations 
from the Rule of Law. This point is clearly articulated by Raz who holds that the 
Rule of Law is but one among any number of values in a given society.85 
Importantly, adherence to the Rule of Law serves to promote those goals 
which themselves are promoted through the law. In this way we can see that 
the Rule of Law ‘fulfils a subservient role. Conformity to it makes the law a good 
instrument for achieving certain goals, but conformity to the rule of law is not 
itself an ultimate goal’.86 
This is a crucial observation. It shows that we value adherence to the Rule 
of Law for certain reasons, namely for its ability to help achieve those social 
goals pursued through the law, not for its own sake. At times, there may be 
other important social goals ‘incompatible with the rule of law’.87 In such cases 
one should not be too quick to jettison the pursuit of those goals simply 
because it conflicts with the Rule of Law. As noted by Raz, ‘[s]acrificing too 
many social goals on the altar of the rule of law may make the law barren and 
empty’.88 Essentially, we must remember that there may be times when 
adherence to the Rule of Law will frustrate an important social goal. Such a 
situation may in fact call for the Rule of Law to be contravened in order to 
achieve a correspondingly greater value of good. 
Minister of Public Works v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association89 
provides a good illustration of how such goals may at times conflict. The 
essential issue in this case was whether or not the state had acted lawfully in 
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erecting an emergency camp for displaced flood victims.90 The respondents 
argued that the State had acted outside the ambit of its powers, that there 
was in fact no enabling legislation in terms of which it had taken action, and 
that, as a result, its actions were unlawful and liable to be set aside.91 The High 
Court had agreed that the State’s actions were unlawful.92 
On appeal, the CC acknowledged ‘that government can only establish 
transit camps for the victims of the floods if the power to do so is conferred on 
it by law’.93 In finding that the State’s actions were in fact lawful, the court 
agreed that there was no legislation in place in terms of which the State could 
act.94 Rather, the court sources the State’s authority from ‘its constitutional 
obligations, to its rights as owner of the land, and to its executive power to 
implement policy decisions’.95 The court could see 
‘no reason why the government as owner of property should not under 
our law have the same rights as any other owner. If it asserts those rights 
within the framework of the Constitution and the restrictions of any 
relevant legislation, it acts lawfully’.96 
Having found the State’s actions to be lawful, the court was able to avoid 
having to condone any unlawfulness on the State’s part. The State and those 
in need of emergency assistance were clearly fortunate in that the relevant 
piece of land was available. However, it is easy to see how, with different facts, 
a court would have had to make a difficult choice between condoning non-
compliance with the Rule of Law and frustrating an important social goal. Were 
the State not able to access suitable vacant land, or only land to which 
restrictions applied, the lawfulness of its actions would be far less certain. 
In such a situation a court would clearly be justified in condoning a breach 
of the Rule of Law given the very significant human interests at stake. The court 
could acknowledge that the Rule of Law is important, but that providing 
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disaster relief in difficult circumstances is vital. In such a situation the 
importance of providing relief for those in need would clearly outweigh the 
need to adhere to the Rule of Law. In fact, adherence to the Rule of Law in 
such a situation would seem to serve no purpose at all, other than for its own 
sake. However, following Raz, sacrificing the social goal of providing such relief 
‘on the altar of the rule of law’ would certainly ‘make the law barren and 
empty’.97 This approach appreciates that the Rule of Law is an ideal, that 
adherence to it is a matter of degree, and that in practice deviations from it 
may be necessary in order to promote other social goals. 
It is therefore a mistake to assume that the Rule of Law, especially a formal 
conception thereof, must be upheld at all costs. Doing so is of course 
understandable, as it goes some way to ensuring the State abides by and 
adheres to the law. However, the Rule of Law is one value among many. Other 
social goals may at times conflict with and override it. When they do, 
adherence to the Rule of Law may conflict with the requirements of justice. 
One way of avoiding having to choose between competing interests is 
with what Beatty calls ‘law’s golden rule’, namely the idea of proportionality.98 
This principle is essentially ‘a test of fairness and reciprocity’ which demands a 
balancing of interests.99 Beatty, however, regards this as part of the Rule of Law 
itself, its incorporation capable of ‘making the concept the best it has ever 
been’.100 One of the virtues of this principle is that it allows judges to make 
decisions ‘compatible with our basic ideas about democracy’ and ‘justice’.101 
The similarity between Raz’s separation thesis and Beatty’s proportionality 
thesis is that they both envisage a weighing up of certain interests. However, 
the crucial difference seems to be that, whereas Raz regards the Rule of Law 
as one value among many to be considered when weighing up various 
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interests, Beatty regards the weighing up of interests as a principle of the Rule 
of Law itself. For Raz, the Rule of Law does not contain a principle of 
proportionality; for Beatty it does. Accordingly, Beatty regards the Rule of Law 
as an ultimate principle within which disputes are resolved via the principle of 
proportionality. 
This idea certainly has a natural appeal. However, as Beatty’s thesis 
regards the principle of proportionality and justice as part of the Rule of Law, it 
suffers from the same defects as other substantive versions of the concept. 
Imbuing the Rule of Law with a range of ideas which are complex enough on 
their own simply makes the Rule of Law even more obscure. It is also not clear 
why one would have to regard the principle of proportionality as part of the 
Rule of Law, as opposed to a separate principle with which to resolve conflicts 
of priorities. At least for this reason, Raz’s separation thesis would seem to be 
preferable. 
5.3  The Rule of Law in South Africa 
5.3.1 Introduction 
Despite the Rule of Law being a foundational value of the Constitution, 
the South African courts have to date not formulated any comprehensive 
definition or understanding of it. Rather its development has been, and 
continues to be, ‘an ongoing process of gradual evolution’.102 The most 
significant of such development has undoubtedly been the introduction and 
development of the principle of legality, which seems to have become the 
primary vehicle through which the Rule of Law is given effect. 
The Rule of Law and the principle of legality are not, however, one and 
the same. Although the CC in Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater 
Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and Others103 stated that it 
was not necessary to decide ‘[w]hether the principle of the rule of law has 
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greater content than the principle of legality’,104 it is clear that the Rule of Law 
is in fact a ‘broader concept’ than the principle of legality.105 As we will see, 
the two concepts also seem to function differently, with implications for how 
they are affected by non-compliance or non-adherence. 
5.3.2 The Principle of Legality 
As we saw in Chapter 1 the CC in Fedsure held that ‘it is a fundamental 
principle of the rule of law, recognised widely, that the exercise of public 
power is only legitimate where lawful’.106 
Furthermore, it is 
‘central to the conception of our constitutional order that the Legislature 
and Executive in every sphere are constrained by the principle that they 
may exercise no power and perform no function beyond that conferred 
on them by law’.107 
This is the principle of legality which essentially ‘requir[es] all exercises of 
public power…to conform to certain accepted minimum standards’.108 At its 
most basic, the principle of legality requires ‘wielders of public powers [to] act 
within their powers’.109 
Since its introduction the principle of legality has been developed to 
encompass more than this initial idea. In Masetlha v President of the Republic 
of South Africa and Another110 the CC stated that, when acting in accordance 
with an empowering provision, the President ‘must not misconstrue the power 
conferred’ and that ‘the decision must be rationally related to the purpose for 
which the power was conferred’.111 
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This requirement of rationality has its origins in Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association of SA and Another: In re Ex parte President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others,112 where the CC held that the exercise of 
public power must be ‘rationally related to the purpose for which the power 
was given’.113 In Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others114 the CC described rationality review as ‘an evaluation of 
the relationship between means and ends’.115 The court held that 
‘if the failure to take into account relevant material is inconsistent with the 
purpose for which the power was conferred, there can be no rational 
relationship between the means employed and the purpose’.116 
These developments of the content of the principle of legality have been 
significant for purposes of holding public power to account. The surprising 
extent of this development can be attributed in large part to the restrictive 
definition of administrative action contained in the PAJA.117 The principle of 
legality conveniently ‘operates as a residual repository of fundamental norms 
about how public power ought to be used’ and is, accordingly, ‘a wonderfully 
useful and flexible device’.118 
5.3.3 Additional requirements of the Rule of Law 
Given that the principle of legality is an aspect of the Rule of Law, the Rule 
of Law must consist of at least the principle of legality. As we saw earlier, 
Mathews regards the principle of legality as the core aspect of the Rule of 
Law.119 As the Rule of Law is a broader concept than the principle of legality, 
it must also then consist of something more. 
The Rule of Law seems to contain a number of other principles not 
necessarily implied by the principle of legality. For example, Raz notes that the 
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Rule of Law necessarily includes the independence of the judiciary and the 
courts having the power to review public acts.120 Mathews agrees that an 
independent judiciary is part of the Rule of Law, but only in the sense that it is 
a necessary requirement with which to ensure the practical realisation of 
legality.121 As such, judicial independence and the principle of legality are 
related, but the former is not necessarily a part of the latter. 
In a number of decisions the South African courts have drawn on the Rule 
of Law to justify a number of such principles. In Dawood v Minister of Home 
Affairs122 the CC held that ‘[i]t is an important principle of the rule of law that 
rules be stated in a clear and accessible manner’.123 In Zondi v MEC for 
Traditional and Local Government Affairs124 the CC held that ‘[t]he right of 
access to courts is an aspect of the rule of law’.125 In Mphahlele v First National 
Bank of South Africa Limited126 the CC held that ‘[t]he rule of law undoubtedly 
requires judges not to act arbitrarily and to be accountable. The manner in 
which they normally account for their decisions is by furnishing reasons’.127 
The Rule of Law has also been said to require that public officials must ‘use 
the correct legal process’ and ‘may not simply resort to self-help’.128 These 
requirements were reaffirmed by the CC in Member of the Executive Council 
for Health, Eastern Cape and Another v Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd.129 The 
essential issue here was whether an organ of state may ignore the defective 
decision of an official without formally applying for the review and setting aside 
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of that decision, and whether a court may set that decision aside where no 
such application is before it.130 The court held that 
‘[e]ven where the decision is defective...government should generally not 
be exempt from the forms and processes of review. It should be held to 
the pain and duty of proper process. It must apply formally for a court to 
set aside the defective decision, so that the court can properly consider 
its effects on those subject to it’.131 
5.3.4 Distinguishing the Rule of Law from the principle of legality 
Apart from being a broader concept than the principle of legality, the 
Rule of Law may also be distinguished from it by differences in the ways they 
operate. As has already been shown, the Rule of Law is a principle and an 
ideal that in practice is realised to a greater or lesser extent. The principle of 
legality, however, and despite its name, seems to operate as a rule prohibiting 
public officials from acting outside the bounds of their authority. 
As Dworkin notes, rules apply in an ‘all-or-nothing fashion’, as opposed to 
principles.132 Likewise, the formulation of the principle of legality suggests that 
it is a rule. This is because it too seems to apply in an all-or-nothing fashion. Any 
public power or function exercised without authorisation is invalid. This is clearly 
an all-or-nothing enquiry; either there was authorisation at the time the power 
was exercised or the function was performed, in which case it is lawful and 
valid, or there was not, in which case it is unlawful and invalid. 
The implications of distinguishing the Rule of Law from the principle of 
legality in this way are important for understanding how they are affected by 
non-compliance. Understood as a rule, a contravention of the principle of 
legality does not have any effect on the rule itself. This is because, despite the 
contravention, the rule continues to exist just as it did before. The same applies 
when the principle of legality is adhered to. Its incidence is therefore neither 
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lessened nor increased through contravention or adherence. In either case it 
is simply unaffected. 
The Rule of Law, however, is affected by non-compliance. As we have 
seen the Rule of Law does not operate as a rule. Its core idea is that the law 
should have authority over power. It is a principle and an ideal which is 
observed to a greater or lesser extent. It may operate as a consideration to be 
taken into account in a specific enquiry, for example when conflicting social 
goals are at stake. In such a situation the Rule of Law may provide more or less 
weight towards the determination of an outcome, rather than determining the 
outcome as a rule would. 
5.3.5 The Rule of Law as a formal principle 
In South Africa there are good reasons for thinking that the Rule of Law 
refers to the formal conception supported by Raz’s separation thesis. When 
one looks at section 1 of the Constitution one sees that the Rule of Law is not 
the only foundational value. In addition the following values are listed: human 
dignity, equality, human rights and freedom,133 ‘[n]on-racialism and non-
sexism’,134 ‘[s]upremacy of the Constitution’,135 ‘[u]niversal adult suffrage, a 
national common voters roll, regular elections and a multi-party system of 
democratic government’.136 
Looking at this list it is clear that there are a number of substantive values 
contained in s 1. There is thus no need for the Rule of Law to encompass them 
all. The very fact that values such as human rights, equality, and democracy 
are included as foundational values provide reason enough for their 
fundamental significance and protection. One may wish to argue that the 
Rule of Law nevertheless must be understood in a substantive sense 
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encompassing these values. However, the very calibration of the Constitution 
suggests otherwise. 
5.4  Unlawful tender awards, the principle of legality and Rule of Law 
5.4.1 Implications for the principle of legality 
The claim that allowing unlawful tender awards to stand somehow 
undermines the principle of legality seems to be premised on the assumption 
that the principle of legality requires unlawful tender awards to be set aside. 
In Bengwenyama Minerals the CC stated that 
‘[i]t would be conducive to clarity, when making the choice of a just and 
equitable remedy in terms of PAJA, to emphasise the fundamental 
constitutional importance of the principle of legality, which requires invalid 
administrative action to be declared unlawful. This would make it clear 
that the discretionary choice of a further just and equitable remedy follows 
upon that fundamental finding. The discipline of this approach will enable 
courts to consider whether relief which does not give full effect to the 
finding of invalidity, is justified in the particular circumstances of the case 
before it’.137 
As authority for this statement the CC relied on the following dictum of the 
SCA in Eskom Holdings Ltd and Others v The New Reclamation Group (Pty) 
Ltd138 where the court stated that ‘[t]he principle of legality would require that 
an invalid administrative decision be set aside’.139 The SCA therefore explicitly 
assumes that part of the principle of legality is that unlawful administrative acts 
must be set aside. 
However, the above dicta in Eskom Holdings and Bengwenyama Minerals 
are not entirely congruent. Only in the former, and earlier, case did the court 
explicitly state that the principle of legality requires unlawful administrative acts 
to be set aside. In the latter case, the court does not go so far. Rather, the court 
emphasises the obligation to declare unlawful conduct invalid, and that any 
further order is within the discretion of the court. 
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More recently, in Joubert Galpin Searle Inc and Others v Road Accident 
Fund and Others140 it was again suggested that the courts are in fact required 
to set aside unlawful administrative acts, and that allowing them to stand is in 
fact a departure from this position. In referring the above dicta from 
Bengwenyama Minerals the court said 
‘I believe it is fair to say that [the CC] made it clear that, even though 
courts always retain a discretion to refuse to award a remedy when 
unlawfulness is found, the default position is that the principle of legality 
should be upheld and vindicated, and that there should be compelling 
reasons to override this default position’.141 
The court does not explicitly state that it is the principle of legality which 
requires unlawful administrative acts to be set aside. However, its reference to 
the need to vindicate the principle of legality suggests that the reasons for 
doing so stem from the principle of legality itself, and not from reasons external 
to it. This suggests a belief that the principle of legality itself calls for acts 
contravening it to be set aside, rather than other reasons relevant to a 
remedial enquiry. 
However, it is not clear that the principle of legality does require invalid 
administrative acts to be set aside.142 We have seen that the principle of 
legality operates as a rule. It stipulates a number of criteria with which the 
exercise of public power must comply in order to be lawful and valid, for 
example that it be legally authorised and rationally related to the purpose for 
which the power was given. The principle of legality, as it is usually formulated, 
does not also stipulate what is to happen in cases of its contravention. 
There is good reason for thinking that the principle of legality does not in 
fact require the setting aside of unlawful administrative actions. As was 
discussed in Chapter 3, the lawfulness enquiry is separate from the remedial 
enquiry. This follows from the wording of s 172 of the Constitution, which requires 
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unlawful conduct to be declared invalid.143 Upon declaring such conduct 
invalid, the court ‘may make any order that is just and equitable’.144 Section 
172 does not require that unlawful administrative actions be set aside, only that 
they be declared invalid. The fact that explicit reference is made to courts 
being given the power to make any order that is just and equitable is itself 
telling; it is in the court’s discretion to grant an appropriate order, a discretion 
which is not conditional. 
This approach was emphasised in Kirland where the minority stated that 
‘in deciding a constitutional matter, a court adopts a two-stage approach 
where an enquiry involves the determination of constitutional invalidity. 
During the first stage, once a court finds that the impugned conduct is 
inconsistent with the Constitution it must make a declaration of invalidity. 
This does not involve the question whether the order is just and equitable. 
The latter enquiry belongs to the second stage’145 during which ‘a court 
enjoys a discretionary choice’.146 
The courts’ continual reference in cases involving unlawful tender awards 
to Bengwenyama Minerals and an ‘amelioration’ of legality therefore must 
mean that, although the principle of legality usually requires the setting aside 
of unlawful administrative actions, the courts may at times decline to do so.147 
However, this line of reasoning conflicts with the now well-entrenched two-
stage approach, as well as the courts’ discretion to grant a just and equitable 
remedy. 
Given that the principle of legality seems to merely prohibit unlawful 
tender awards, and not require their setting aside, the implications for it which 
arise from a court allowing an unlawful tender award to stand are simply none 
whatsoever. The requirements of the principle of legality assist in determining 
whether an action was lawful or not. The content of the principle does not 
                                                          
143 S 172(1)(a). 
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147 It could not mean, for instance, that the relevant aspect of the principle of legality infringed, 
for example rationality, did not require a rational decision to be made in the relevant case 
and therefore that the act is not unlawful as a result. 
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change as a result of the unlawful award being allowed to stand; the action is 
still considered unlawful, and the same action would also be considered 
unlawful in future.  
As such, it makes little sense to regard the principle of legality as 
ameliorated when unlawful tender awards are allowed to stand. The principle 
of legality simply does not dictate what is to be done in the event of its breach. 
This latter enquiry falls squarely within the constitutionally sanctioned discretion 
of the courts, and is a remedial concern separate from the lawfulness enquiry. 
5.4.2 Implications for the Rule of Law 
Unlike with the principle of legality, allowing unlawful tender awards to 
stand does have implications for the Rule of Law. This is because the Rule of 
Law is not a rule, but a principle and an ideal to be aspired to. As such, it is 
almost certainly unrealisable in practice, meaning that it is inevitable that at 
times it will not be complied with it. As the CC noted in Kirland 
‘the Constitution foresees that the administration that would answer to it 
would be imperfect. Those charged with state administration will inevitably 
on occasion fall short of the high aspiration of just administrative action’.148 
Being an ideal, when the Rule of Law is undermined there is then ‘less’ of 
it than were it adhered to. As such, it is then realised to a lesser degree than if 
it were not undermined, and so its incidence is less. This aspect of the Rule of 
Law has been recognised by the CC. In Bengwenyama Minerals the CC stated 
that ‘the rule of law must never be relinquished’.149 In the context of this 
passage the court recognised that at times the Rule of Law will be undermined. 
In Kirland the CC stated that ‘[t]he law does not allow us to uphold the 
rule of law while at the same time circumvent and undermine it. In the long 
run, shortcuts of this kind will erode the rule of law as one of the foundational 
values of our Constitution’.150 Two features stand out from this passage. First, 
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the court again recognises that the gradual undermining of the Rule of Law 
over time can lessen the incidence of the Rule of Law, meaning that there 
would be less of it than if it were consistently upheld. In this the court is correct. 
This also accords with what has been said about the Rule of Law so far, namely 
that as an ideal it is upheld to a greater or lesser extent. 
Secondly, the court seems to imply that the Rule of Law may not be 
undermined. In this the court is almost certainly incorrect. This also contradicts 
what was said in Bengwenyama Minerals. We have seen that it cannot be a 
requirement that the courts uphold the Rule of Law come what may. The Rule 
of Law is one among a number of values of a legal system, and its true value 
lies primarily in its ability to ensure the realisation of other social goals. 
Adherence to the Rule of Law for its own sake therefore makes little sense. 
Of course there is the danger that the Rule of Law may be relinquished if 
it is undermined to such an extent that law ceases to have authority over 
official power. However, this concern by itself does not provide a sufficient 
reason to ensure that the Rule of Law is never undermined. Rather, it provides 
a reason to ensure that the Rule of Law is generally aspired to, and then only 
insofar as it ensures the realisation of other valuable social goals. If in some 
situations maintaining the Rule of Law is incompatible with an important social 
goal, then undermining the Rule of Law may be entirely appropriate. Allowing 
an unlawful tender award to stand in circumstances where setting it aside 
would cause significant harm is simply an example of this occurring in practice; 
the court sanctions the Rule of Law being undermined in order to achieve a 
social goal the realisation of which is deemed more important in the 
circumstances. 
5.5 Conclusion 
It is not a requirement of the principle of legality that unlawful tender 
awards must be set aside. The principle of legality is a rule according to which 
the lawfulness of public actions may be determined. The subsequent remedial 
enquiry is a separate concern altogether, within the discretion of the courts. 
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The outcome of this remedial enquiry, which may be to allow an unlawful 
tender award to stand, does not have an effect on the requirements of the 
principle of legality; the tender award in question would still be unlawful. 
With the Rule of Law, things are different. The Rule of Law functions as a 
principle, and an ideal which in practice is upheld to a greater or lesser 
degree. There are also good reasons for understanding the Rule of Law in 
formal terms in South Africa. It is, after all, one among a number of foundational 
values of the Constitution, and a significant number of other substantive values 
which could otherwise be considered part of the Rule of Law are provided for 
elsewhere in the Founding Provisions and the Bill of Rights. 
Although unlawful tender awards clearly undermine the Rule of Law, 
courts are not bound to uphold it no matter the cost. The Rule of Law must be 
considered alongside other valuable social goals, the totality of which may 
demand the undermining of the Rule of Law. In this way a court’s decision to 
allow an unlawful tender award to stand, which arguably sanctions the Rule of 
Law being undermined, can be properly understood, despite the Rule of Law’s 





The development of subjecting government procurement to judicial 
scrutiny in South Africa has presented a number of issues. First, the procurement 
regime itself has come under strain given the frequency of challenges to very 
significant procurement decisions. Secondly, the courts have been forced to 
play an increasingly important role in exercising oversight of these decisions. 
An unenviable procurement framework, official incompetence, and 
widespread corruption have not helped matters. As it stands, unsuccessful 
tenderers will for the foreseeable future continue to request the courts to set 
aside procurement decisions suspected of being awarded unlawfully. 
Unfortunately, this will continue to delay the implementation of those policies 
which form the basis of the government tenders in question. 
A sound approach to determining the lawfulness of these awards is 
therefore essential. In this regard, the unequivocal separating of the lawfulness 
and remedial enquiries has been a welcome development. It accords 
squarely with s 217, and ensures that courts will not be distracted by remedial 
concerns in determining the lawfulness or otherwise of an award. 
Inevitably, the facts of a case may be such that the court declines to set 
aside an unlawful tender award. Such a decision is not justified by the courts 
having a discretion to do so. Rather, it is justified by the totality of reasons which 
favour adopting an Interest Balancing approach over a Rights Maximising one. 
This is especially so in cases concerning tender awards, where there are often 
significant interests in addition to those of the tenderers in question, and where 
affording relief typical of a Rights Maximising approach would harm the 
interests of innocent parties. 
Awarding a government tender unlawfully undoubtedly contravenes the 
principle of legality. Perhaps because of this, the decision to allow an unlawful 
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tender award to stand may be perceived as conflicting with the principle of 
the legality, with concerns for its consequences for the Rule of Law. 
It is not entirely unreasonable to assume that the principle of legality 
requires unlawful tender awards to be set aside. The principle of legality does, 
after all, prohibit unlawful acts. However, when the concept is considered in 
more detail it seems that it does not necessarily require that unlawful tender 
awards be set aside. What the principle of legality does is to provide a number 
of requirements according to which the lawfulness of public actions may be 
determined. In this way the principle of legality operates as a rule, prohibiting 
those acts which do not conform to its requirements. 
Nothing about this requires a public act which contravenes the principle 
of legality to be set aside. Furthermore, when both s 172(1) of the Constitution 
and s 8(1) of the PAJA are considered it is seen that the courts, far from having 
an obligation to set such acts aside, in fact have a discretion to grant any order 
which they consider to be just and equitable. This includes an order whereby 
the unlawful award is left undisturbed. The principle of legality therefore does 
not impose an obligation on the courts to set aside these awards. Any concern 
that legality is somehow ‘ameliorated’ by allowing unlawful tender awards to 
stand is therefore misplaced. There is no requirement of the principle of legality 
which is not given effect to when unlawful tender awards are allowed to stand, 
and as such it is not affected by such an order. 
As far as the Rule of Law is concerned, its incidence is clearly diminished 
when a government tender is awarded unlawfully. Given that the courts are 
obliged to uphold the Rule of Law it may seem that these awards must be set 
aside. This, however, depends on how we understand the Rule of Law. If the 
Rule of Law were the apex substantive principle of law to which all else was 




However, this is almost certainly not what the Rule of Law means in South 
Africa. It is an ideal to be aspired to, and it also stands alongside a number of 
other substantive principles in the Constitution, and so need not encompass 
them all. Contraventions of the Rule of Law from time to time are also 
inevitable. As such, the mere fact of contravention should not be the sole 
determinant of whether or not the contravening act should be set aside. It may 
feature in the court’s determination, as principles do, but ultimately the 
question of whether or not acts performed in contravention of the Rule of Law 
should take cognisance of broader societal interests. This is required if an order 
is to be made that meets the requirement of being just and equitable. 
Total adherence to the Rule of Law should clearly not be pursued at all 
cost. There may at times be social goals which conflict with the Rule of Law, 
and where adhering to the Rule of Law may come at too great a price. In such 
circumstances it is entirely reasonable to allow the contravention of the Rule 
of Law. Government tender awards inevitably concern social goals. Setting 
them aside may therefore come at a significant social cost. If, in a specific 
case, this social cost is too great, the court should indeed decline to set the 
relevant award aside. By doing so the court would not be relinquishing its 
judicial function to uphold the Rule of Law. Rather, it would be making an order 
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